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Searle's original argument doesn't involve a digital computer. What is there in the Chinese Room which experiences the qualia someone who understands Chinese d

Searle's original argument doesn't involve a digital computer. What is there in the Chinese Room which experiences the qualia someone who understands Chinese does? There's just a person, who tells you he doesn't, and a printed algorithm, which is just ink on paper. Is there a disembodied consciousness?

hackinthebochs 9y ago
>What is there in the Chinese Room which experiences the qualia someone who understands Chinese does? The system instantiated by the book, the man performing instructions, his memory and/or external memory aids, etc. The key point is that there is a new system that produces and consumes semantic information that is entirely distinct from the man. For example, if a question was asked to describe a childhood experience, no experience from the man's childhood would be communicated.
- DonaldFisk 9y ago
  The system is only an abstraction though, only existing in the mind of the observer, e.g. the Chinese speaker outside the room. The man's brain is processing the information, even if he doesn't understand its meaning. You seem to be arguing that consciousness arises whenever information is processed by whatever means, and is a property of the process and not the processor per se. It's an interesting argument but I'm not convinced by it.
  - cygx 9y ago
    What's your take on brain simulation?
    - DonaldFisk 9y ago
      The person in the Chinese Room could in principle simulate the brain of a Chinese speaker, but would still not know what it is like to understand the Chinese words he's processing. Note the distinction between "understand" and "knows what it is like to understand". I accept that the system of man + algorithm does understand Chinese. But it does no know what it is like.
      - cygx 9y ago
        Assume, for the sake of the argument, that we'll eventually have computers powerful enough to simulate brains to the accuracy we think necessary for it to function. There are several ways this experiment could go: First, we could fail to produce a mind, because there's some secret sauce to it we're not aware of (eg a God-given soul). Second, we could produce a zombie, indistinguishable from a conscious individual while actually not being conscious (though note that we'd have to treat it as if it were conscious, for reasons that should be obvious). Third, we could produce a conscious mind. I'm in the camp that thinks option three is plausible. Let's assume I'm right. Now, instead of a supercomputer, give every one of the billions of humans on the planet an instruction manual, a pocket calculator and a phone to communicate results, and have them do the exact same calculations the supercomputer would do. Despite the latency, if option three were true, we should expect that this would still produce a conscious mind, albeit a rather slowly-thinking one.
      - barrkel 9y ago
        The person in the Chinese Room could in principle simulate the brain of a Chinese speaker, but would still not know what it is like to understand the Chinese words he's processing. This is addressed by the Turing Test: the point is that if there is no observable difference, does it matter? You can't tell if other people understand Chinese either. Personally, the only logical conclusion I can draw is panpsychism. I think a rock rolling down hill experiences free will and perceives its random path as a series of choices.
        cygx 9y ago
        That's not the only logical conclusion one can draw: Consciousness could be an emergent phenomenon requiring a certain amount of complexity that an individual rock lacks.
  - hackinthebochs 9y ago
    >only existing in the mind of the observer, e.g. the Chinese speaker outside the room. Why do you think this? Each component of the system has physical embodiment and causal efficacy. It's just as "real" as the man himself. >You seem to be arguing that consciousness arises whenever information is processed by whatever means The Chinese room experiment isn't about consciousness specifically, its about semantics (meaning) vs syntax. Whether or not something that understands is conscious is a different question.

hackinthebochs 9y ago

>What is there in the Chinese Room which experiences the qualia someone who understands Chinese does? The system instantiated by the book, the man performing instructions, his memory and/or external memory aids, etc. The key point is that there is a new system that produces and consumes semantic information that is entirely distinct from the man. For example, if a question was asked to describe a childhood experience, no experience from the man's childhood would be communicated.

DonaldFisk 9y ago
The system is only an abstraction though, only existing in the mind of the observer, e.g. the Chinese speaker outside the room. The man's brain is processing the information, even if he doesn't understand its meaning. You seem to be arguing that consciousness arises whenever information is processed by whatever means, and is a property of the process and not the processor per se. It's an interesting argument but I'm not convinced by it.
- cygx 9y ago
  What's your take on brain simulation?
  - DonaldFisk 9y ago
    The person in the Chinese Room could in principle simulate the brain of a Chinese speaker, but would still not know what it is like to understand the Chinese words he's processing. Note the distinction between "understand" and "knows what it is like to understand". I accept that the system of man + algorithm does understand Chinese. But it does no know what it is like.
    - cygx 9y ago
      Assume, for the sake of the argument, that we'll eventually have computers powerful enough to simulate brains to the accuracy we think necessary for it to function. There are several ways this experiment could go: First, we could fail to produce a mind, because there's some secret sauce to it we're not aware of (eg a God-given soul). Second, we could produce a zombie, indistinguishable from a conscious individual while actually not being conscious (though note that we'd have to treat it as if it were conscious, for reasons that should be obvious). Third, we could produce a conscious mind. I'm in the camp that thinks option three is plausible. Let's assume I'm right. Now, instead of a supercomputer, give every one of the billions of humans on the planet an instruction manual, a pocket calculator and a phone to communicate results, and have them do the exact same calculations the supercomputer would do. Despite the latency, if option three were true, we should expect that this would still produce a conscious mind, albeit a rather slowly-thinking one.
    - barrkel 9y ago
      The person in the Chinese Room could in principle simulate the brain of a Chinese speaker, but would still not know what it is like to understand the Chinese words he's processing. This is addressed by the Turing Test: the point is that if there is no observable difference, does it matter? You can't tell if other people understand Chinese either. Personally, the only logical conclusion I can draw is panpsychism. I think a rock rolling down hill experiences free will and perceives its random path as a series of choices.
      - cygx 9y ago
        That's not the only logical conclusion one can draw: Consciousness could be an emergent phenomenon requiring a certain amount of complexity that an individual rock lacks.
- hackinthebochs 9y ago
  >only existing in the mind of the observer, e.g. the Chinese speaker outside the room. Why do you think this? Each component of the system has physical embodiment and causal efficacy. It's just as "real" as the man himself. >You seem to be arguing that consciousness arises whenever information is processed by whatever means The Chinese room experiment isn't about consciousness specifically, its about semantics (meaning) vs syntax. Whether or not something that understands is conscious is a different question.