4 ms·
Time delays only provide a false sense of security. In theory I could always cut open the casing and just plug wires straight into the EMMC or whatever you have
by dheera 9y ago
Time delays only provide a false sense of security. In theory I could always cut open the casing and just plug wires straight into the EMMC or whatever you have in there. Your time delay UI is useless if I just bypass your UI and wire straight into the hardware.
Of course that's non-trivial EE work, but the point is it's possible, for someone with enough money and the right equipment. What would make it intractable is to ditch the idea that a 4 digit pin is protecting you from anything. There's simply not enough entropy in that.
Time delays are useful protection when over a network. But not when the attacker has physical console access, e.g. to a phone. At that point proper cryptography and mathematics is the only good protection.
- jrockway 9y agoI mean, I don't think they're dumb enough to put unencrypted data out on busses that you can just probe. All the encryption is done inside the same package as the CPU; if you read the RAM or flash directly, you'll just get garbage because it's encrypted. https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone is the generic version of this, no idea what exactly Apple is doing. Anyway, to break the encryption involves finding bugs in the software that runs in the secure zone (the same way you'd defeat a time delay in a networked application) or by opening up the CPU die and figuring it out with an electron microscope (perhaps while the CPU is running). Ultimately, software is going to be the productive attack vector. While the TrustZone docs emphasize "small" for the amount of code that runs in the secure zone, no programmer can ever do "small" on a deadline and so I wouldn't trust it to provide any actual security. But the hardware infrastructure is there to be pretty secure against any adversary that doesn't have a lot of time or money, if the programmers do their job correctly. (I don't trust it because of the time schedules involved for these SoCs. One or two a year, with a lifetime of maybe a couple years. Nobody is going to spend the money to do the hard work like looking for bugs just so that someone can't rip Netflix video feeds. The engineering work would be more expensive than whatever their contract with the DRM vendors says they have to pay if they get hacked, which is the only incentive to be secure... and I doubt Apple would sign one of those.
- greglindahl 9y agoOne of the points of having a secure enclave is that it can enforce things like time delays. I doubt that the time delay in question is only enforced by the UI outside the enclave.
- abalone 9y agoYou misunderstand the SEP. It contains an externally unreadable private key baked in at manufacturing time that encrypts protected data. Your "wires" would read garbage. The iOS security white paper is worth a read. Perhaps a nation-state actor could shave down the processor and read that key with a SEM or some crazy thing, but that's literally how far the design is supposed to have pushed iOS security. Which is what makes this hack so embarrassingly bad (if confirmed).
- bufferoverflow 9y agoSEMs are not that expensive. The cheap ones on eBay are $12-14K. The more expensive Chinese ones are closer to $200K. A security company can easily afford either.
- matthewmacleod 9y agoI don't think the acquisition of a SEM is the barrier to performing this kind of attack. It's still extremely hard
- abalone 9y agoI think I read somewhere that some secure coprocessors incorporate physical defenses that will destroy keys if you try to shave them down or physically tamper. So yeah. Hard.
- whyenot 9y agoGetting a SEM would be the easy part. The hard part would be sample preparation and interpreting the results.
- dheera 9y ago> Perhaps a nation-state actor could shave down the processor and read that key with a SEM or some crazy thing, but that's literally how far the design is supposed to have pushed iOS security. Which is what makes this hack so embarrassingly bad (if confirmed). Shaving down the processor is hard but still possible. A government with a billion-dollar budget can probably do it, if they want, including after practicing on a million throwaway phones in the process. Apple's design is also known as security by obscurity (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity). I much prefer an open design and security by high-entropy keys and well-established practices in the cryptography. I'd feel much safer using open cryptography libraries and strong passwords than arbitrarily and blindly trusting some secretive engineers at Apple. Apple's design is super-hard to break but possible. My Linux laptop, on the other hand -- the hard drive is standard SATA. Have at it. I don't care if you have a billion dollars, you'll have a hard time breaking into my data for a probably at least a few decades.