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This seems at odds with Apple’s claims about holding the device encryption keys in a secure coprocessor that only releases them in response to a valid passcode,
by closeparen 9y ago
This seems at odds with Apple’s claims about holding the device encryption keys in a secure coprocessor that only releases them in response to a valid passcode, and self-destructs the keys if too many passcodes are tried.
- djrogers 9y agoIt’s not at odds with it - it’s pretty obviously using a vulnerability to run a crack against the passcode. Once the passcode is found, that is used to unlock the phone and this the Secure Enclave.
- hedora 9y agoThe enclave software has supposedly been formally verified (It is based on the L4 microkernel). This looks like a software flaw, not a hardware attack. It will be interesting to know how Apple screwed this up.
- matthewmacleod 9y agoI agree it’s not at odds with it, but it’s not even that simple - the passcode is enforced by the Secure Enclave itself. It’s not a case of “try passcodes until you find the right one then tell the SEP” - it has to be exploiting a vulnerability in the SEP itself, assuming what we know of the design and attack is true.
- rphlx 9y agoTechnically, this does not absolutely have to be a SEP vuln. It's possible that the PIN is being stored (not properly zero'd-after-use) somewhere outside the SEP, i.e. a pinpad entry buffer or something. Often criminals do not think of, or are unable to, turn off their phone when being arrested. Furthermore the iPhone battery is not removable and some portions of its DRAM - in theory anyway - could persist even when the phone is "off". Apple has (or at least - prior to public outrage - had) a fairly loose definition of "off" for other aspects of the system, such as bluetooth.
- matthewmacleod 9y agoNah, I don’t think so, but if true it would hint at a vulnerability in the implementation of the Secure Enclave.