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I think theoretical physics might be in need of a short dose of internal reflection and debate coupled with some side reading of contemporary philosophy, metaph
by a_humean 9y ago
I think theoretical physics might be in need of a short dose of internal reflection and debate coupled with some side reading of contemporary philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. These sorts of debates around concepts like "naturalness" and "laws of nature" are philosophical bread and butter.
This isn't to say that modern philosophers aren't susceptible to alluring desert landscapes like "naturalness", but at least philosophers are trained to think about and critique these kinds of things. Physics needs to be capable of having this debating itself and recognise assumptions with wobbly metaphysical underpinnings.
- thanatropism 9y agoThis is so very important. In particular, there's a long-accumulating need for a revision of the current dogma on the philosophy of science and its operationalization -- Popper falsificationism, peer review, publication-oriented research, freaking null hypothesis... Most of our current science has happened before Popper and falsificationism, so there is nothing "essentially true" about the current M.O. of science. And heck, was it falsificationism that brought us vaccines, nuclear energy and computers? Because there's a replication crisis going on in many scientific fields, and particle physics doesn't fit the mold of falsificationism at all. I'm not coming forward with a solution in an HN comment, but I think we need to stop equating science, the civilizational project, with this specific philosophy of science and social system for organizing science.
- fdej 9y agoCould you elaborate on what you perceive as the problem with falsificationism? I'm familiar with the philosophical argument that Popper's demarcation of science is too narrow. What is less clear is that this argument over the definition of science currently has any influence on scientific practice. Are there some examples where scientists (or funding agencies) have adhered to "falsificationism" in a way that impeded progress? This is in contrast with the other issues you mentioned: peer review, publication-oriented research and abuse of the null hypothesis (by which I assume you mean p-hacking and its cousins), which I agree are very real problems in practice.
- thanatropism 9y ago> Could you elaborate on what you perceive as the problem with falsificationism? Operationally? You have to pick a null hypothesis. You have to carve reality in two, specify two possible universes and ask an experiment to tell you which universe where you're in. Darwinism (the one in Darwin's works) isn't like this. Adhesion to falsificationism would have nipped that one in the bud. Stuff like this is the way forward: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_holism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_holism
- dahauns 9y agoI always wonder where this naive falsificationism as a point of critique comes from. Certainly not from Popper, as he already argued for holism in the sense of Duhem and Quine from the beginning (Logik der Forschung was written in 1934!)...
- Confusion 9y agoFrom addressing the great many naive falsificationists that have heard of, or were taught, Popper’s basic idea without any of his elaborations and footnotes, let alone those by people like Quine, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, ... A little knowledge can be a dangerously misleading thing.
- mannykannot 9y agoYou have to understand what is known of the physics before you can philosophize usefully about the metaphysics, and that is what the physicists who are thinking about things like "naturalness" are doing. As Eliezer Yudkowsky pointed out, millennia of epistemology did not prepare us for quantum mechanics, and Bergson's intuitions about time did not prepare him for relativity.