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Well, yes, until everything is a bit more secure because companies take it more seriously or the computer industry has learned a valuable lesson, and then every
by kbenson 9y ago
Well, yes, until everything is a bit more secure because companies take it more seriously or the computer industry has learned a valuable lesson, and then everyone has benefited because of that.
Either the flaws will get priced into the stock forecasting and cost of doing business in the industry or people won't care (there are strong indications it's the latter for these flaws).
It's the exact same for people that do this to alert on regular companies. Markets function efficiently when there is lots of accurate information. These people are exposing new information (either previously unknown or hidden by people with a vested interest), which allows the markets to function more efficiently afterwards (which might mean using better info to choose who not to trust with your data, etc). What they get out of it is the ability to execute on the new information slightly before everyone else.
This of course assumes the data is real. If it's not there is no public benefit, so it's just fraud. I was under the impression that at least some of the flaws were very trumped up, so it was a little complicated whether they did something wrong, but if most /all are real and cause make problems, then I guess I don't have much of a problem with what they've done even if I do think they've taken a slightly less safe route for the public in order to maximize money. Like freedom of speech is one of those things that I don't always like how it's used but I recognize the good far outweighs the bad.
- notacoward 9y ago> until everything is a bit more secure because companies take it more seriously That logic works for full vs. limited (or no) disclosure, but not for immediate vs. 90-day disclosure. In general, the incentive for a vendor with a reasonable embargo period is the same as without, because the effect on their reputation is the same. The only people differently affected are users, who are left more vulnerable for longer than they would have been. Even if one could argue that vendors deserve shaming for what might have been a simple mistake, users surely deserve better. It's very easy for those who do not suffer the damage from their actions to rationalize their impulsive (or in this case venal) behavior, but that's just another kind of agency problem that people who fling economic jargon around should consider.
- kbenson 9y ago> The only people differently affected are users, who are left more vulnerable for longer than they would have been. The assumption being that nobody else knows about the flaws? We can argue about how likely it is some other people knew about the flaw on a case by case basis, but a blanket statement that assumes that there was no risk while it was unreported is not accurately portraying the situation. > Even if one could argue that vendors deserve shaming for what might have been a simple mistake, users surely deserve better. I'm arguing that the risk that the companies exposed people to prior to the announcement (to a small degree), and the risk people may be exposed to after the announcement (to a large degree) are the incentive for someone doing this to take advantage of a short. Would I personally prefer less public risk through a coordinated exposure? Sure. Am I willing to state that it should be required? I don't think so, since that may greatly reduce the incentive of someone looking to do the investigative legwork. I think that's a net loss for the public, since the risk is still there, it's just reduced (since it's not widely known), but it will exist in that reduced state for a long period (possibly indefinitely). When the choice is between an unknown risk (which can by high) for an indeterminate period or a semi-high risk for a short period (with the ability to mitigate risk as needed, since you know about it), I'll take the latter over the former.
- notacoward 9y ago> The assumption being that nobody else knows about the flaws? Not nobody, but fewer. The information in a disclosure like this will focus a whole lot of miscreants' attention on something they might not have thought of before. > that may greatly reduce the incentive of someone looking to do the investigative legwork Now you're the one making assumptions. Most people don't need the incentive of an immediate crisis to do that legwork. Often, the mere fact that the bugs are real is enough, regardless of timelines. In most other cases, the fact that the clock is ticking is sufficient. If somebody has a proven track record of taking these things lightly then forcing their hand might be justified. Otherwise, you're essentially telling people you think they're lazy or negligent when you have no evidence of such. That's not a good way to start a collaborative process, in a situation where collaboration might be key to a timely fix.