4 ms·

Presumably you'd want a deniable system. So, something where you have a private key 'k', some function 'f', and the public chain 'p'. So, you compute: r = f(k,

by darawk 9y ago

Presumably you'd want a deniable system. So, something where you have a private key 'k', some function 'f', and the public chain 'p'. So, you compute: r = f(k, p) Suppose r may be 1 or 0. The meaning of 1/0 will be randomly distributed among the population, and will be made known to you when you place your vote, but at no other time. So, later on, you understand that a value of 1 means your vote counted for candidate A, but if someone tries to coerce you, you can realistically claim the opposite.

geofft 9y ago
How do you know that the people tallying the vote have the same meaning for r? (That is, how do you prevent a butterfly-ballot-style situation where people think they're voting for Gore, accurately cast a ballot that appears to them to be a vote for Gore, and actually end up casting an objectively valid vote for Buchanan?)
- darawk 9y ago
  Presumably you could generate some proof that the vote was correctly cast at the moment you cast it, and that 1 corresponds to A and 0 corresponds to B. But that proof would not be accessible after you leave the polling booth (because it'd require some ephemeral value that you could retain or throw away).
- breatheoften 9y ago
  Maybe you could do a block tallying with verification scheme. 1. Enter your vote and receive an identifier 2. Group n identifiers into a batch ensuring not all votes in the batch are for the same candidate. Record the n identifiers into a block then randomly order the identifiers but don’t record the randomized sort order. Display the index of their identifier to each user but don’t record it. Record the actual vote in this (random) order to the block. Allow each voter to see all votes recorded in the block at each location (including the one only they know represents their vote). Allow the voter to manually tally the block to ensure the sum of symbols reflects their vote intent. Present to each voter cryptographic proof of the existence of the block and the net affect the block as a whole has on the vote tally for each candidate. Each voter leaves with: 1. cryptographic proof of having voted 2. Cryptographic verification of the effect their vote had on vote tally 3. Ability to claim having voted for any candidate represented in their voting block/inability to prove to others who they voted for while being sure of how their vote was counted themselves.

by darawk 9y ago

geofft 9y ago

How do you know that the people tallying the vote have the same meaning for r? (That is, how do you prevent a butterfly-ballot-style situation where people think they're voting for Gore, accurately cast a ballot that appears to them to be a vote for Gore, and actually end up casting an objectively valid vote for Buchanan?)

darawk 9y ago
Presumably you could generate some proof that the vote was correctly cast at the moment you cast it, and that 1 corresponds to A and 0 corresponds to B. But that proof would not be accessible after you leave the polling booth (because it'd require some ephemeral value that you could retain or throw away).
breatheoften 9y ago
Maybe you could do a block tallying with verification scheme. 1. Enter your vote and receive an identifier 2. Group n identifiers into a batch ensuring not all votes in the batch are for the same candidate. Record the n identifiers into a block then randomly order the identifiers but don’t record the randomized sort order. Display the index of their identifier to each user but don’t record it. Record the actual vote in this (random) order to the block. Allow each voter to see all votes recorded in the block at each location (including the one only they know represents their vote). Allow the voter to manually tally the block to ensure the sum of symbols reflects their vote intent. Present to each voter cryptographic proof of the existence of the block and the net affect the block as a whole has on the vote tally for each candidate. Each voter leaves with: 1. cryptographic proof of having voted 2. Cryptographic verification of the effect their vote had on vote tally 3. Ability to claim having voted for any candidate represented in their voting block/inability to prove to others who they voted for while being sure of how their vote was counted themselves.