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No, they didn't confirm serious vulnerabilities. Excerpt from their blog: >There is no immediate risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities for most users.

No, they didn't confirm serious vulnerabilities. Excerpt from their blog: >There is no immediate risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities for most users. Even if the full details were published today, attackers would need to invest significant development efforts to build attack tools that utilize these vulnerabilities. This level of effort is beyond the reach of most attackers

cthalupa 9y ago
None of that discounts these from being serious vulnerabilities. If you are utilizing the secure coprocessor on a machine that is tasked with keeping secrets secure, and you are worried about sophisticated attackers, then this is incredibly serious. Just because it doesn't impact you, or the majority of users, does not mean it is not a severe issue. The majority of users are quite likely to be of low interest to attackers wanting to exploit the secure coprocessor in the first place.
- hoistbypetard 9y ago
  > If you are utilizing the secure coprocessor on a machine that is tasked with keeping secrets secure, and you are worried about sophisticated attackers, then this is incredibly serious. If you are worried about sophisticated attackers, and you are trusting a "secure coprocessor" with such an unspecified and undocumented interface as this, I'd argue that you have no reason to think that the tool you have chosen to defend against the threat you're worried about is adequate. Contrast a coprocessor with no documented security boundary (if I'm missing something on that front, please post a link!) against a traditional HSM. Sure, the latter have had some flaws too, historically, but the well-defined boundary is key to even being able to assess suitability. I've not seen any documentation of this coprocessor's interface/boundaries at all. Let alone any that approaches the level of detail you'd get with an HSM.
  - cthalupa 9y ago
    I'd agree there - but that doesn't stop AMD from advertising this as a function these CPUs provide, so if you've taken them at their word, this is a big deal.

cthalupa 9y ago

None of that discounts these from being serious vulnerabilities. If you are utilizing the secure coprocessor on a machine that is tasked with keeping secrets secure, and you are worried about sophisticated attackers, then this is incredibly serious. Just because it doesn't impact you, or the majority of users, does not mean it is not a severe issue. The majority of users are quite likely to be of low interest to attackers wanting to exploit the secure coprocessor in the first place.

hoistbypetard 9y ago
> If you are utilizing the secure coprocessor on a machine that is tasked with keeping secrets secure, and you are worried about sophisticated attackers, then this is incredibly serious. If you are worried about sophisticated attackers, and you are trusting a "secure coprocessor" with such an unspecified and undocumented interface as this, I'd argue that you have no reason to think that the tool you have chosen to defend against the threat you're worried about is adequate. Contrast a coprocessor with no documented security boundary (if I'm missing something on that front, please post a link!) against a traditional HSM. Sure, the latter have had some flaws too, historically, but the well-defined boundary is key to even being able to assess suitability. I've not seen any documentation of this coprocessor's interface/boundaries at all. Let alone any that approaches the level of detail you'd get with an HSM.
- cthalupa 9y ago
  I'd agree there - but that doesn't stop AMD from advertising this as a function these CPUs provide, so if you've taken them at their word, this is a big deal.