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Our Interesting Call with CTS-Labs
- ComputerGuru 9y agoI think it was very quickly obvious to everyone what the deal here was. Why are we still giving them the limelight?
- mizzao 9y agoCan you please elaborate?
- Arbalest 9y agoGamers Nexus did a good video. Long story short, looks like an investment propaganda attempt to try and get a profit out of shorting AMD stock. Whether this is a cover for anything else is getting deep into conspiracy. Edit: Not truly fake news
- tptacek 9y agoExcept that we know it isn't fake, as Trail of Bits validated the findings and confirmed serious vulnerabilities.
- Level3Basic 9y agoExactly. CTS May be sloppy or naive, but if the people they claim to have shared the vulnerabilities with have been verified, then there's no reason to think there's a Big Conspiracy of Stock Shorters here.
- Arbalest 9y agoNot truly fake, then again, a lot of propaganda is also based on an element of truth. Is there any meaningful distinction between propaganda and fake news?
- tptacek 9y agohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kh0Y2hVe_bw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kh0Y2hVe_bw I accept with basically no questions that the announcement was coordinated to enable a stock-shorting scheme. You might be interested to know: this isn't the first time that's happened. I don't care. I don't think these stock-shorting schemes work. I agree with Matt Levine: attempts to profit from stock declines are far from the worst things people can do with vulnerability research --- for instance, they could collude with vendors to withhold disclosure for months or years, which is something that happens. Where I have problems: * When AMD fanatics try to spin the confusion about the story into a claim that CTS-Labs didn't find anything, which we know now to be false. * When anybody reacts to the confusion by announcing to Hacker News that there are immutable norms of vulnerability disclosure that were broken in this case, especially when those supposed norms are false and most especially when they assert obligations researchers have to vendors.
- ComputerGuru 9y agoI don’t even have a problem with shorting. It’s fair game, and a company’s bug bounty should reflect what they stand to lose by not paying top dollar to preempt exactly that. Any talk about the company being “entitled” to anything is BS. If someone had a vulnerability that would get them access into anyone’s Dropbox as their IPO rolls out.. they’ve earned it. I just think if that’s your plan, you best not be bluffing and had better have something really good up your sleeve. I do have a problem with overstating your case and spreading FUD to try to make a quick buck off of at best B+ attempt.
- xeeeeeeeeeeenu 9y agoNo, they didn't confirm serious vulnerabilities. Excerpt from their blog: >There is no immediate risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities for most users. Even if the full details were published today, attackers would need to invest significant development efforts to build attack tools that utilize these vulnerabilities. This level of effort is beyond the reach of most attackers
- cthalupa 9y agoNone of that discounts these from being serious vulnerabilities. If you are utilizing the secure coprocessor on a machine that is tasked with keeping secrets secure, and you are worried about sophisticated attackers, then this is incredibly serious. Just because it doesn't impact you, or the majority of users, does not mean it is not a severe issue. The majority of users are quite likely to be of low interest to attackers wanting to exploit the secure coprocessor in the first place.
- hoistbypetard 9y ago> If you are utilizing the secure coprocessor on a machine that is tasked with keeping secrets secure, and you are worried about sophisticated attackers, then this is incredibly serious. If you are worried about sophisticated attackers, and you are trusting a "secure coprocessor" with such an unspecified and undocumented interface as this, I'd argue that you have no reason to think that the tool you have chosen to defend against the threat you're worried about is adequate. Contrast a coprocessor with no documented security boundary (if I'm missing something on that front, please post a link!) against a traditional HSM. Sure, the latter have had some flaws too, historically, but the well-defined boundary is key to even being able to assess suitability. I've not seen any documentation of this coprocessor's interface/boundaries at all. Let alone any that approaches the level of detail you'd get with an HSM.
- cthalupa 9y agoI'd agree there - but that doesn't stop AMD from advertising this as a function these CPUs provide, so if you've taken them at their word, this is a big deal.
- ComputerGuru 9y agoI have no doubt that the findings are real, but they are more along the lines of bugs rather than “halt the press” gaping security holes. We’ve all publicly disclosed and written patches for countless security vulnerabilities in open source code that’s widely distributed with zero fanfare - not even a cve - because we realize the difference between a security bug and a world-stopping, corporation-killing security bug. And the arrogance of saying something along the lines of “if I gave them a day or a million years it wouldn’t matter because this bug is too big to fix,” is beyond comment. At no point did I give RedHat 24 hours to patch something before coming out with a well-orchestrated PR campaign with the hype engine on overdrive. Just submit a patch, make sure they admit they’re wrong and will take the appropriate measures, and move on. Now if they found a remote exploit that could let me run arbitrary code on any AMD processor even in a sandboxes environment... we’d be having a different discussion altogether.
- tptacek 9y agoIf you have admin access to these machines, you can persist into the secure coprocessor. In the presence of these vulnerabilities, it is actually worse to have a secure coprocessor than not to have one at all. They are serious vulnerabilities; about the worst you can have in an enclave scheme. If SGX had a comparable problem, it would be headline news. Does that mean the stock should head to zero, like some crazy prop trading firm claimed they should? The fuck should I know? I am cynical about the impact vulnerabilities have on stock prices and don't think consumers generally care.
- ComputerGuru 9y agoI’m with you, but again, context. A compromised machine used to be a hosed machine until you reinitialized the drive and started clean. People are just starting to wake up to the fact that there’s another computer in your computer to which the same maxims apply. Anyone that is serious about security hopefully knows this. (I have no skin in the AMD/Intel CPU game. Too many machines running both to bother. I can’t believe I have to say this on HN, it’s what I’d expect of [H]ard in 2004.)
- fencepost 9y ago
- disconnected 9y agoRelevant: trail of bits posted a summary of this situation on their blog: https://blog.trailofbits.com/2018/03/15/amd-flaws-technical-summary/ https://blog.trailofbits.com/2018/03/15/amd-flaws-technical-...
- disconnected 9y ago(replying to myself, sorry if inappropriate) Possibly also relevant, previous HN discussion on another vulnerability on AMD's PSP, reported and fixed in December 2017 (but only disclosed in January 2018): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16081141 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16081141
- proaralyst 9y agoJust FYI: you can edit your original comment, which is likely the better method in the future.
- tptacek 9y agoThis is crazymaking. I posted the Trail of Bits technical summary earlier today: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16595184 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16595184 Trail of Bits --- which has a reputation in the field approaching "unimpeachable" --- confirmed a series of serious vulnerabilities. Whether there are real findings involved in this report isn't in question, and hasn't been since the day of the announcement, when Dan Guido from Trail of Bits confirmed that they'd reviewed and confirmed the finding. It's ironic, or maybe it isn't, that after CTS-Labs published their findings in a manner basically optimized for innuendo than Anandtech has run a story that is basically composed of innuendo. Given how charged people's feelings about AMD seem to be, this is probably manna from heaven for them, and since CTS-Labs isn't publishing the full technical details, it'll be raining bread for them for many days to come. I wouldn't care, except that after the original monster thread about the CTS-Lab announcement, it's become apparent that HN commenters have a very poor understanding of how vulnerability research actually works, and Anandtech is perpetuating some of those myths, like the idea that researchers invariably (or even routinely) arrange for CVE allocation when publishing new flaws.
- bri3d 9y agoI wish they'd gotten some answers for the Viceroy situation, which is the main sketchy part of this endeavor. Beyond that it seems like a set of real vulns with pretty real impact hindered for the HN crowd by an overly glitzy PR push. The ToB blog post is what should have come out concurrently to satisfy the overly cynical HN crowd - maybe good notes for CTS for next time. It's ironic that the overall reaction here was so jaded when people are up in arms about Intel ME every time it's so much as mentioned.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- newprint 9y agoStrange thing about article, is that CTS-Labs founders admit that they used to work for intelligence. I know several people, who worked for intelligence. They never say "I worked for intelligence" and instead, tell you what they currently do and completely bypass "intelligence".
- cmurf 9y agoSome things don't change, even when old mottos are updated. (Mossad previous motto: "For by stratagems you wage war." (Proverbs 24:6) or as translated into a book partly titled on the subject, "by way of deception, you wage war." But then, this isn't exactly hidden in the case of CTS Labs. http://www.cts-labs.com/management-team http://www.cts-labs.com/management-team 3 out of 4.
- nl 9y agoPeople from Unit 8200 aren't too private about. They have a pretty good reputation for founding big, successful companies. https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardbehar/2016/05/11/inside-israels-secret-startup-machine/#651d7841a519 https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardbehar/2016/05/11/inside-... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_8200#Companies_founded_by_alumni https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_8200#Companies_founded_by...
- gascan 9y agoReads kind of like a name-drop.
- dman 9y agoAm curious if it is legal to fund security research to find flaws in a competitors product. If so then going forward this might become a tool used by hardware / software companies to go after their competition.
- AdamWoods 9y agoI can't think of a reason why it wouldn't be completely legal? Unless there's some sort of ToS violation, however it'd be interesting to see how that would stand up to legal scrutiny. There are however clear ethical considerations surrounding disclosure which is really interesting in this case.
- dsacco 9y ago> Am curious if it is legal to fund security research to find flaws in a competitors product. It’s legal. I’ve been hired to do it before.
- dman 9y agoAny restrictions at the time of disclosure?
- dsacco 9y agoI’m not sure how you mean; in general, I was tasked with finding vulnerabilities that could be used for reverse engineering purposes and which woukdn’t be disclosed.
- dman 9y agoAh I meant the legality of funding efforts to find glaring bugs in competitors products and then releasing them publicly as a 0-day.
- jlgaddis 9y agoGoogle (Project Zero) has found and published plenty of vulnerabilities in Microsoft products.
- nimrod0 9y agoBefore anyone claims they know wtf they are talking about, answer the following real technical questions -- I haven't seen a single one who has (including the so-called "Trail of Bits"): 1. Can Ryzenfall and Fallout be exploited without code signed by AMD? 2. Can Masterkey be exploited even after disabling the PSP in the BIOS which AMD has allowed since January?
- hoistbypetard 9y agoRegarding your first question, why would that matter if the code that is signed by AMD is out in the wild already and can be executed in a manner that makes the exploit work? That is how I read the situation, anyway; I don't think these people who didn't contact AMD in advance are getting new code signed by AMD to run their exploit. If they have some means of getting AMD to sign anything they want, that's bigger news than any of the vulnerabilities they are currently talking about. My read was that they're exploiting a flaw in some readily available, already signed-by-AMD code to load something new and behave badly. If that's the case, I don't see why the answer to (question 1) would be meaningful. If that's not the case, do you have a link to the explanation that claims getting new code signed by AMD is necessary?
- chx 9y agoOne note here: David Kanter from RealWorldTech is the, well, real deal. Few, if any have a better understanding of the chipmaking industry. " semiconductor industry consultant, " is a very modest description of someone leading RWT for 16 years now.
- jabl 9y agoYeah, though unfortunately it's quite seldom there's new articles on RWT these days. Mr Kanter is somewhat active on the forum, though.
- HugoDaniel 9y ago"C: Say, for example, CTS-Labs were in charge of finding Meltdown and Spectre, you would have also followed the same path of logic? YLZ: I think that it would have depended on the circumstances of how we found it, how exploitable it was, how reproducible it was. I am not sure it would be the case. Every situation I think is specific."
- stuaxo 9y agoDodgy AF,I don't see how anyone with any credibility could work with then in the future.