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> Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does. It isn't the copy that changes things. It is the pot
by ericb 9y ago
> Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does.
It isn't the copy that changes things. It is the potential of a copy that makes it glaringly obvious that the result is not the same instance. If there is some process that makes a second me, I don't have access to the copy of me's thoughts. This proves second me isn't actually me because I'm still here, and we are trying to define what I am, and at-minimum, my definition of my consciousness does not include other consciousnesses which I don't have access to.
> Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them?
Yes.
While I think programming isn't perfect as an analogy, there is no other vein in which people think that has as many good metaphors for this. On the contrary, I think these corner cases are where you can actually refine your reasoning about these things. I think many of your corner cases are really useful because it is entirely conceivable that many could leave the realm of silicon and enter the world of flesh and blood (like memory merges, etc).
- kolpa 9y ago> second me isn't actually me Then who is it? It remembers being you.
- ericb 9y agoOk, I have a clone of you in the other room and a gun. I am going to kill either you or them. You pick. Who do you pick? Why? My suspicion is that most people suddenly realize they prefer the instance of their consciousness they are inhabiting.
- ajuc 9y agoIf you merge our memories afterwards it doesn't matter who you kill. Otherways it's a murder.
- ericb 9y agoThere's no merge. The question is not whether it is a crime, that's irrelevant. The question is, which one you prefer I terminate. You, the one I'm talking to, or the other person in the other room. The preference most people have is "the other one" which pretty much lays bare that these two instances are not, in fact, equivalent because they are "in" one of these consciousnesses, and not the other.
- ajuc 9y agoIf there's no merge, then these 2 copies diverged and are not the same, so I prefer me. If there was a merge then there should be no difference.
- ericb 9y ago> then these 2 copies diverged and are not the same I agree. For me, this implies divergence, even divergence of location (which happens automatically on a copy) is a change of identity, and so true identity must be inextricably linked to a continuity of location through time. Because of this, I reason that any copy operation, even a destructive one, is a change of identity and not-me, because it is really just a creation of a second instance and as mentioned, I would prefer this instance keep running over another if faced with my murderous thought experiment. If merged into me, I agree it could become part of new-me.
- ajuc 9y ago> It is the potential of a copy that makes it glaringly obvious that the result is not the same instance. Well for me the potential for a copy doesn't make anything obvious or impossible.