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>wosign Are you name dropping wosign just to be obtuse? They were untrusted because they were untrustworthy, not because Google just doesn't like them. https:
by niij 9y ago
>wosign
Are you name dropping wosign just to be obtuse? They were untrusted because they were untrustworthy, not because Google just doesn't like them. https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an...
- vbezhenar 9y agoI don't trust any US company, so it's not any more untrustworthy for me than DigiCert, for example. I'm dropping its name because they were offering free 3-year certificates and it was the best TLS experience I've ever had.
- niij 9y agoThere's a lot of countries I don't trust to keep sensitive data in. But my point is that Wosign was provably untrustworthy, rather than speculation on government interference in other CAs. I saw from your Github that you live in Kazakhstan, I would remind you the government is less than trustworthy as well[0] in regards to digital privacy. [0]: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/12/14/kazakhstan_wants_citizens_to_download_a_mandatory_national_security_certificate.html http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/12/14/kazakhsta...
- asdbffg 9y agoI doubt, that any government is inherently more trustworthy than any other. It just coincidentally happens, that US controls 100% of root CAs and Kazakhstan (most likely) controls 0. So the later needs more audacious measures, while former can just issue a gag order to Symantec (or whoever is currently active in market). CA system is inherently vulnerable to government intervention. There is no point in considering defense against state agents in HTTPS vulnerability model. It is busted by default.
- stargrazer 9y agoMaybe not 100%. Bermuda has a root CA: QuoVadis Global.