3 ms·

> If I cloned you, tortured your clone and killed it while you were asleep, then merged his memories to you - was it you who I was torturing or not? Why is the

by ericb 9y ago

> If I cloned you, tortured your clone and killed it while you were asleep, then merged his memories to you - was it you who I was torturing or not? Why is the difference meaningful? If I merged the bash logs where I nuked rm -rf / on a given computer into the logs of one where I have not ran that command, the result is not the same. > You can serialize an instance of a class, delete the instance, then deserialize it. This would not be the same object since you can do that, but not delete the object. Programming is a great analogy. I think the answer for identity/consciousness, even in programming involves an uninterrupted flow of unique locations in time/space that has continued existing as a cohesive whole. > Some GC languages can move objects in memory when the application is running. Is this the same object? In general, if there can be "two" instances simultaneously utilizing a given approach (like mind transfer), then it is not the same "one." But this is a flow, so ship of theseus alterations like you propose do not change identity, they are part of the flow. > Then sleeping is the same as death. I can't rule that out, actually, although I seem to be conscious some of it, so there's that.

ajuc 9y ago
> If I merged the bash logs where I nuked rm -rf / on a given computer into the logs of one where I have not ran that command, the result is not the same. What if you had 2 git repositories, and merged changes from one to another? Or 2 disk images? Why would memories be logs and not contents of the repository in this analogy? And if you care about changes to the brain state that aren't memories - just add these changes to the brainstate. You argue that no matter how perfectly we merge these brainstates, it's still not "me" after the merge. I argue - if there's no difference after the split, then the question is meaningless. > This would not be the same object since you can do that, but not delete the object. So what? Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does. You can make a clone of a disk or a memorydump, and restore it on another computer. Why would the uniqueness matter? You can run 100 copies on 100 computers and use that for redundancy. When a program is running on modern CPU it executes code predictively, going both ways on some ifs. Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them? Let's say for a moment that universe is a simulation, and there is a backup. Does that make "us" suddenly not "us" because there is a copy? Why? Because of all these corner cases I don't think programming is a good analogy.
- ericb 9y ago
  > Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does. It isn't the copy that changes things. It is the potential of a copy that makes it glaringly obvious that the result is not the same instance. If there is some process that makes a second me, I don't have access to the copy of me's thoughts. This proves second me isn't actually me because I'm still here, and we are trying to define what I am, and at-minimum, my definition of my consciousness does not include other consciousnesses which I don't have access to. > Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them? Yes. While I think programming isn't perfect as an analogy, there is no other vein in which people think that has as many good metaphors for this. On the contrary, I think these corner cases are where you can actually refine your reasoning about these things. I think many of your corner cases are really useful because it is entirely conceivable that many could leave the realm of silicon and enter the world of flesh and blood (like memory merges, etc).
  - kolpa 9y ago
    > second me isn't actually me Then who is it? It remembers being you.
    - ericb 9y ago
      Ok, I have a clone of you in the other room and a gun. I am going to kill either you or them. You pick. Who do you pick? Why? My suspicion is that most people suddenly realize they prefer the instance of their consciousness they are inhabiting.
      - ajuc 9y ago
        If you merge our memories afterwards it doesn't matter who you kill. Otherways it's a murder.
        ericb 9y ago
        There's no merge. The question is not whether it is a crime, that's irrelevant. The question is, which one you prefer I terminate. You, the one I'm talking to, or the other person in the other room. The preference most people have is "the other one" which pretty much lays bare that these two instances are not, in fact, equivalent because they are "in" one of these consciousnesses, and not the other.

by ericb 9y ago

ajuc 9y ago

> If I merged the bash logs where I nuked rm -rf / on a given computer into the logs of one where I have not ran that command, the result is not the same. What if you had 2 git repositories, and merged changes from one to another? Or 2 disk images? Why would memories be logs and not contents of the repository in this analogy? And if you care about changes to the brain state that aren't memories - just add these changes to the brainstate. You argue that no matter how perfectly we merge these brainstates, it's still not "me" after the merge. I argue - if there's no difference after the split, then the question is meaningless. > This would not be the same object since you can do that, but not delete the object. So what? Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does. You can make a clone of a disk or a memorydump, and restore it on another computer. Why would the uniqueness matter? You can run 100 copies on 100 computers and use that for redundancy. When a program is running on modern CPU it executes code predictively, going both ways on some ifs. Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them? Let's say for a moment that universe is a simulation, and there is a backup. Does that make "us" suddenly not "us" because there is a copy? Why? Because of all these corner cases I don't think programming is a good analogy.

ericb 9y ago
> Why would existence of a copy change anything? In programming it doesn't, yet you seem to argue it does. It isn't the copy that changes things. It is the potential of a copy that makes it glaringly obvious that the result is not the same instance. If there is some process that makes a second me, I don't have access to the copy of me's thoughts. This proves second me isn't actually me because I'm still here, and we are trying to define what I am, and at-minimum, my definition of my consciousness does not include other consciousnesses which I don't have access to. > Does that split identities into 2 and immediately kills one of them? Yes. While I think programming isn't perfect as an analogy, there is no other vein in which people think that has as many good metaphors for this. On the contrary, I think these corner cases are where you can actually refine your reasoning about these things. I think many of your corner cases are really useful because it is entirely conceivable that many could leave the realm of silicon and enter the world of flesh and blood (like memory merges, etc).
- kolpa 9y ago
  > second me isn't actually me Then who is it? It remembers being you.
  - ericb 9y ago
    Ok, I have a clone of you in the other room and a gun. I am going to kill either you or them. You pick. Who do you pick? Why? My suspicion is that most people suddenly realize they prefer the instance of their consciousness they are inhabiting.
    - ajuc 9y ago
      If you merge our memories afterwards it doesn't matter who you kill. Otherways it's a murder.
      - ericb 9y ago
        There's no merge. The question is not whether it is a crime, that's irrelevant. The question is, which one you prefer I terminate. You, the one I'm talking to, or the other person in the other room. The preference most people have is "the other one" which pretty much lays bare that these two instances are not, in fact, equivalent because they are "in" one of these consciousnesses, and not the other.