Just because someone sits behind a computer doesn't mean they get to have complete control over and privacy within that computer. Specifically, when they do not

Just because someone sits behind a computer doesn't mean they get to have complete control over and privacy within that computer. Specifically, when they do not own that computer and are payed by someone else to do work using that computer. In this sense, corporate users truly are different from private users. Similarly, company e-mail is not confidential. A very important requirement to this treatment of corporate users is that the end user ought to be made aware of this. Both with the company e-mail and the proxied company computer. Part of the issue here is that sometimes encryption is bad. I for one dread the day I'll have to install some binary blob that communicates using TLS with a pinned cert I cannot override. Similarly, encryption and secure hardware modules are what enable boot-locked devices. The point being, cryptography can be used to take away control. Not just from big institutions but also from end users. If we admit that sometimes cryptography is bad, there might be cases where we want a controlled way to break it. Again, this should be done with notice and all responsibilities lying with those taking the risk. That is, the party responsible for securing the proxy is also the party that is screwed when the proxy is compromised. This might sound like encouraging key-escrow for government acces. It definitely does not. The issue there is notice (or choice, if non-escrow becomes outlawed) and the fact that a compromised system hurts end users, not the government. Thus, the incentives are misaligned for the government.