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A deist creator explanation is equally untestable, but is probably less parsimonious than a multiverse explanation.

sa46 9y ago
What does "less parsimonious" mean in this context? The definition has "unwilling to spend money or use resources; stingy or frugal" but I'm not sure what you're describing as less frugal. Is it a way of saying the deist explanation is more likely?
- mdorazio 9y ago
  I think in this context it means that adding a deity into the explanation is adding an unnecessary extra element where none is needed. Thus the explanation is less "frugal" than one where we assume a multiverse without any creator(s).
  - incompatible 9y ago
    The difficulty for any theory is explaining why anything exists at all, i.e., if there's no space and no time, isn't that a stable state? Without time, how could anything ever happen? If a multiverse theory could give a way to get a universe out of nothing, it would be a lot more elegant than a deity theory. The deity theory after all is incomplete, it just supposes that our universe is embedded inside some sort of "outer" universe where deities live, but that outer universe also has to be created somehow.
  - glenstein 9y ago
    >I think in this context it means that adding a deity into the explanation is adding an unnecessary extra element where none is needed. I want to reiterate that I think the side you are arguing for is ultimately the "right" one, but I'm not sure I buy this argument. Sometimes parsimony is having a fundamental thing that other things "reduce" to, that other things are explained in terms of. Someone intent on adding a deity can insist that it's not merely one extra thing among a dozen things. Instead, it is the one fundamental thing that gives rise to the dozen things. And therefore is more parsimonous. I wonder if the right thing to do here is bite the bullet and admit that, yes, such a thing would be simpler, but you merely think you have a simpler thing when really you have smoke and mirrors.
- gloriousduke 9y ago
  It means the deist explanation doesn't stand up to Occam's razor as well as the multiverse explanation. "Parsimony" in this context comes from the latin, lex parsimoniae, "law of parsimony." Adding a deity to the explanation requires adding an "entity" completely nonexistent in the current models that are the basis for the multiverse, i.e. those within quantum theory and cosmology.
  - Veelox 9y ago
    >the current models that are the basis for the multiverse, i.e. those within quantum theory and cosmology. The root of my question is I am uninformed of anything with quantum theory or cosmology that makes a multiverse more likely than deism. Do you have specific examples from quantum theory or cosmology that makes a multiverse more likely?
  - glenstein 9y ago
    I'm definitely on your side in terms of where I ultimately lean, but I don't feel satisfied that this is a strong enough answer. I think the deist can insist "My explanation is the most parsimonous. I have just the one thing, a deity. You have a kludge of a dozen different forces and laws and variables."
    - TeMPOraL 9y ago
      That's why you see "Kolmogorov complexity" being mentioned all around this thread. The "parsimony", the "simplicity", the unit in which we count entities - is that of Kolmogorov complexity. "A dozen different forces and laws and variables" is significantly simpler, Kolmogorov-wise, than a thinking entity. There is orders of magnitude less things to specify about the former than about the latter for a complete description.
- dalbasal 9y ago
  Explaining multiple things, for a simple (though not full) definition. Neuton's laws of gravitation/motion can explain why a ball travels in an arch, why the moon rotates around the sun and why an apple fell on his head. It's frugal in the sense that a dutch oven is frugal. You can use it to make pie, bread, soup...
- archontes 9y ago
  I believe what he or she means is that it assumes more, and is thus less 'stingy' in this way.
dragonwriter 9y ago
Since neither has any explanatory power that is not already contained in the phenomena they are offered to explain, they are equally complete failures of parsimony, differing only in which aesthetic preferences they appeal to.
- glenstein 9y ago
  I disagree with this. I think you are 100% right when you say: >Since neither has any explanatory power that is not already contained in the phenomena they are offered to explain, That is what these different explanations have in common, for sure. However, you seem to be defining that as parsimony. But there may be a lot of different explanations that are equally wrong, that differ in how complex they are, and those differences are differences in parsimony.
  - dragonwriter 9y ago
    > However, you seem to be defining that as parsimony. No, it's just, essentially, the numerator of parsimony; the denominator is the complexity added to the model; but a zero numerator makes consideration of the denominator irrelevant. (Normally, you compare parsimony of explanations with non-zero explanatory power, so the denominator matters a lot.)
    - glenstein 9y ago
      I see what you are saying, but I guess I just don't accept that definition of parsimony because it includes explanatory power as an input into the value of parsimony. In just about every context I've encountered the concept, it has been used as a means of distinguishing between theories of equal explanatory power.

sa46 9y ago

What does "less parsimonious" mean in this context? The definition has "unwilling to spend money or use resources; stingy or frugal" but I'm not sure what you're describing as less frugal. Is it a way of saying the deist explanation is more likely?

mdorazio 9y ago
I think in this context it means that adding a deity into the explanation is adding an unnecessary extra element where none is needed. Thus the explanation is less "frugal" than one where we assume a multiverse without any creator(s).
- incompatible 9y ago
  The difficulty for any theory is explaining why anything exists at all, i.e., if there's no space and no time, isn't that a stable state? Without time, how could anything ever happen? If a multiverse theory could give a way to get a universe out of nothing, it would be a lot more elegant than a deity theory. The deity theory after all is incomplete, it just supposes that our universe is embedded inside some sort of "outer" universe where deities live, but that outer universe also has to be created somehow.
- glenstein 9y ago
  >I think in this context it means that adding a deity into the explanation is adding an unnecessary extra element where none is needed. I want to reiterate that I think the side you are arguing for is ultimately the "right" one, but I'm not sure I buy this argument. Sometimes parsimony is having a fundamental thing that other things "reduce" to, that other things are explained in terms of. Someone intent on adding a deity can insist that it's not merely one extra thing among a dozen things. Instead, it is the one fundamental thing that gives rise to the dozen things. And therefore is more parsimonous. I wonder if the right thing to do here is bite the bullet and admit that, yes, such a thing would be simpler, but you merely think you have a simpler thing when really you have smoke and mirrors.
gloriousduke 9y ago
It means the deist explanation doesn't stand up to Occam's razor as well as the multiverse explanation. "Parsimony" in this context comes from the latin, lex parsimoniae, "law of parsimony." Adding a deity to the explanation requires adding an "entity" completely nonexistent in the current models that are the basis for the multiverse, i.e. those within quantum theory and cosmology.
- Veelox 9y ago
  >the current models that are the basis for the multiverse, i.e. those within quantum theory and cosmology. The root of my question is I am uninformed of anything with quantum theory or cosmology that makes a multiverse more likely than deism. Do you have specific examples from quantum theory or cosmology that makes a multiverse more likely?
- glenstein 9y ago
  I'm definitely on your side in terms of where I ultimately lean, but I don't feel satisfied that this is a strong enough answer. I think the deist can insist "My explanation is the most parsimonous. I have just the one thing, a deity. You have a kludge of a dozen different forces and laws and variables."
  - TeMPOraL 9y ago
    That's why you see "Kolmogorov complexity" being mentioned all around this thread. The "parsimony", the "simplicity", the unit in which we count entities - is that of Kolmogorov complexity. "A dozen different forces and laws and variables" is significantly simpler, Kolmogorov-wise, than a thinking entity. There is orders of magnitude less things to specify about the former than about the latter for a complete description.
dalbasal 9y ago
Explaining multiple things, for a simple (though not full) definition. Neuton's laws of gravitation/motion can explain why a ball travels in an arch, why the moon rotates around the sun and why an apple fell on his head. It's frugal in the sense that a dutch oven is frugal. You can use it to make pie, bread, soup...
archontes 9y ago
I believe what he or she means is that it assumes more, and is thus less 'stingy' in this way.

dragonwriter 9y ago

Since neither has any explanatory power that is not already contained in the phenomena they are offered to explain, they are equally complete failures of parsimony, differing only in which aesthetic preferences they appeal to.

glenstein 9y ago
I disagree with this. I think you are 100% right when you say: >Since neither has any explanatory power that is not already contained in the phenomena they are offered to explain, That is what these different explanations have in common, for sure. However, you seem to be defining that as parsimony. But there may be a lot of different explanations that are equally wrong, that differ in how complex they are, and those differences are differences in parsimony.
- dragonwriter 9y ago
  > However, you seem to be defining that as parsimony. No, it's just, essentially, the numerator of parsimony; the denominator is the complexity added to the model; but a zero numerator makes consideration of the denominator irrelevant. (Normally, you compare parsimony of explanations with non-zero explanatory power, so the denominator matters a lot.)
  - glenstein 9y ago
    I see what you are saying, but I guess I just don't accept that definition of parsimony because it includes explanatory power as an input into the value of parsimony. In just about every context I've encountered the concept, it has been used as a means of distinguishing between theories of equal explanatory power.