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Question, if assuming a multiverse to explain the exactness of the cosmological constant is a defensible position, is there any reason not to consider the deist

• gloriousduke 9y ago
  A deist creator explanation is equally untestable, but is probably less parsimonious than a multiverse explanation.
  • sa46 9y ago
    What does "less parsimonious" mean in this context? The definition has "unwilling to spend money or use resources; stingy or frugal" but I'm not sure what you're describing as less frugal. Is it a way of saying the deist explanation is more likely?
    • mdorazio 9y ago
      I think in this context it means that adding a deity into the explanation is adding an unnecessary extra element where none is needed. Thus the explanation is less "frugal" than one where we assume a multiverse without any creator(s).
      • incompatible 9y ago
        The difficulty for any theory is explaining why anything exists at all, i.e., if there's no space and no time, isn't that a stable state? Without time, how could anything ever happen? If a multiverse theory could give a way to get a universe out of nothing, it would be a lot more elegant than a deity theory. The deity theory after all is incomplete, it just supposes that our universe is embedded inside some sort of "outer" universe where deities live, but that outer universe also has to be created somehow.
      • glenstein 9y ago
        >I think in this context it means that adding a deity into the explanation is adding an unnecessary extra element where none is needed. I want to reiterate that I think the side you are arguing for is ultimately the "right" one, but I'm not sure I buy this argument. Sometimes parsimony is having a fundamental thing that other things "reduce" to, that other things are explained in terms of. Someone intent on adding a deity can insist that it's not merely one extra thing among a dozen things. Instead, it is the one fundamental thing that gives rise to the dozen things. And therefore is more parsimonous. I wonder if the right thing to do here is bite the bullet and admit that, yes, such a thing would be simpler, but you merely think you have a simpler thing when really you have smoke and mirrors.
    • gloriousduke 9y ago
      It means the deist explanation doesn't stand up to Occam's razor as well as the multiverse explanation. "Parsimony" in this context comes from the latin, lex parsimoniae, "law of parsimony." Adding a deity to the explanation requires adding an "entity" completely nonexistent in the current models that are the basis for the multiverse, i.e. those within quantum theory and cosmology.
      • Veelox 9y ago
        >the current models that are the basis for the multiverse, i.e. those within quantum theory and cosmology. The root of my question is I am uninformed of anything with quantum theory or cosmology that makes a multiverse more likely than deism. Do you have specific examples from quantum theory or cosmology that makes a multiverse more likely?
      • glenstein 9y ago
        I'm definitely on your side in terms of where I ultimately lean, but I don't feel satisfied that this is a strong enough answer. I think the deist can insist "My explanation is the most parsimonous. I have just the one thing, a deity. You have a kludge of a dozen different forces and laws and variables."
        • TeMPOraL 9y ago
          That's why you see "Kolmogorov complexity" being mentioned all around this thread. The "parsimony", the "simplicity", the unit in which we count entities - is that of Kolmogorov complexity. "A dozen different forces and laws and variables" is significantly simpler, Kolmogorov-wise, than a thinking entity. There is orders of magnitude less things to specify about the former than about the latter for a complete description.
    • dalbasal 9y ago
      Explaining multiple things, for a simple (though not full) definition. Neuton's laws of gravitation/motion can explain why a ball travels in an arch, why the moon rotates around the sun and why an apple fell on his head. It's frugal in the sense that a dutch oven is frugal. You can use it to make pie, bread, soup...
    • archontes 9y ago
      I believe what he or she means is that it assumes more, and is thus less 'stingy' in this way.
  • dragonwriter 9y ago
    Since neither has any explanatory power that is not already contained in the phenomena they are offered to explain, they are equally complete failures of parsimony, differing only in which aesthetic preferences they appeal to.
    • glenstein 9y ago
      I disagree with this. I think you are 100% right when you say: >Since neither has any explanatory power that is not already contained in the phenomena they are offered to explain, That is what these different explanations have in common, for sure. However, you seem to be defining that as parsimony. But there may be a lot of different explanations that are equally wrong, that differ in how complex they are, and those differences are differences in parsimony.
      • dragonwriter 9y ago
        > However, you seem to be defining that as parsimony. No, it's just, essentially, the numerator of parsimony; the denominator is the complexity added to the model; but a zero numerator makes consideration of the denominator irrelevant. (Normally, you compare parsimony of explanations with non-zero explanatory power, so the denominator matters a lot.)
        • glenstein 9y ago
          I see what you are saying, but I guess I just don't accept that definition of parsimony because it includes explanatory power as an input into the value of parsimony. In just about every context I've encountered the concept, it has been used as a means of distinguishing between theories of equal explanatory power.
• incompatible 9y ago
  The problem with artificial creation (and simulation) theories is that they can generate universes of all kinds without restriction, including one that's consistent with our own in every way. I'm not sure that there could ever be a way to disprove such theories. If theories are going to be useful, they'll have to predict something which can be confirmed with follow-up observations.
  • dalbasal 9y ago
    In fairness, the OP was comparing the merit of a deist creator to the merit of multiverse as an explanation of the cosmological constant. Does the multiverse theory predict something which can be confirmed with follow-up observations or that is falsifiable in some way? I don't actually know the answer to this, but I've heard a similar criticism of simulation theories. Unless we add some more specific information to the theory, it's not really a scientific theory for that reason. How would a simulated/created universe look?
    • incompatible 9y ago
      Yeah, good question.
    • thaumasiotes 9y ago
      > Unless we add some more specific information to the theory, it's not really a scientific theory for that reason. That would be why it's called the "many-worlds interpretation".
      • dalbasal 9y ago
        Good point. People using language carefully (as physicists usually do) call it an interpretation for a reason. The OP's point on deism vs multiverse vs simulation (added later in the thread) is actually fairly interesting. Reductio ad deism.
  • Veelox 9y ago
    >If theories are going to be useful, they'll have to predict something which can be confirmed with follow-up observations. If you can name something that the multiverse predicts that could be confirmed with observations (possible observations we will not be able to make in my lifetime) I would appreciate it. My current understanding is that there is nothing predictive about the multiverse theory thus my initial question.
• MrBingley 9y ago
  One difference is that the multiverse emerges as a natural extension of many existing physical theories (string theory, inflation, many-worlds, etc). The deist perspective is a more ad-hoc solution: it doesn't have any evidence that supports it directly, just that we currently don't know the answer to this problem.
  • Veelox 9y ago
    >the multiverse emerges as a natural extension of many existing physical theories (string theory, inflation, many-worlds, etc). I might have looked in the wrong places but I have looked a little why the multiverse is a good explanation but I haven't found anything of the sort. The best explanations I have seen seem to amount to "we got lucky with our universe, the best way to explain that luck is that there are a lot of universes". I haven't seen any reason why it shouldn't be "we got lucky with our universe, the best way to explain that luck is that it was done on purpose". Would you be willing to explain how you get from observed data or well regarded theories to a multiverse?
    • deleted 9y ago
      [deleted]
    • xelxebar 9y ago
      Occam's Razor, essentially. The basic idea is that most multiverse notions arise naturally out of lower level mechanisms. A theistic explanation requires extra low level mechanics. Say all of our experiments are explained by Theory X. Then positing Thoery X + God is a model with strictly more moving parts and equal explanatory power as Theory X alone. On a wider level, explanations like "God did it" tend to operate on the same level as calling the phenomenon "magic"---it's an analysis that doesn't really provide any actionable information on how to influence said phenomenon. In that way, I personally see "magic" and "God" as operating more in the realm of storytelling. Practically, I find good storytelling is helpful for things like identity-building and theatre, but if I wanna build a bridge then my money's on minimum Kolmogorov complexity, i.e. Occam's Razor.
      • 9y ago
• archontes 9y ago
  I think that physicists do consider the deist view whenever they consider whether the universe is a simulation. You wouldn't call it a deist view, though, because it explores the minimum criteria, that the universe was created (Well, most specifically, that the universe is the result of a computation. The computation itself could be entirely incidental). By whom or what is not useful to the exercise, and is omitted. Usually that part is important to deists.
• natecavanaugh 9y ago
  Even assuming a multiverse explanation doesn't exclude a deist view. It just kicks the can down the road to one more level. I think as long as we have a "something", we will want to understand where that comes from and what else there might be that is not that something. Some argue a self-existant eternal universe, and some a self-existant eternal Creator. Personally, I believe the Creator view, but both stances are articles of faith that would be impossible to prove definitively.
  • stcredzero 9y ago
    Even assuming a multiverse explanation doesn't exclude a deist view. It just kicks the can down the road to one more level. Because the Creator theory is non-falsifiable. I forget which physicist used the phrase, but that would be termed, "Not even false."
    • natecavanaugh 9y ago
      I thought about editing my response to add that neither of them were falsifiable. Is there anything in this universe that could falsify a multiverse theory? They both seem so meta as to be faith based, but I don't know enough to state for sure, so I'm happy to be proven wrong :) Edit: and can the theory explain where the multiverse comes from, or anything about it? To me, it seems like another way of trying to answer the question with more questions, but no way of discovering the answers. A sort of "God of the gaps" line of reasoning that just s/God/multiverse/ the entire thing.
      • stcredzero 9y ago
        To me, it seems like another way of trying to answer the question with more questions, but no way of discovering the answers. If you answer one set of questions, you get another set of questions. So what? Should we just make up an answer and stop asking? I don't find that very intellectually satisfying. You're right that there's no evidence for a multiverse yet, so it's just one of many conjectures. If the point you're making is that the notion of God is just as unsupported as the notion of a multiverse, yeah, I'd accept that. They're both "Not even false." Occam's Razor them both.
• lisper 9y ago
  > is there any reason not to consider the deist view No reason not to consider it, but the evidence against it is overwhelming. Specifically, the evidence is overwhelming that whatever the ultimate cause is, it is computationally simple, that is, its Kolmogorov complexity is small. That is fundamentally at odds with most people's conception of God.
  • hyperpallium 9y ago
    What's the evidence that the first cause had low Kolmogorov complexity?
    • lisper 9y ago
      The fact that the laws of physics can be written as simple mathematical equations.
      • oldandtired 9y ago
        These "laws" of physics can be written as simple mathematical equations only because these equations make various simplifying assumptions. Whenever mathematics is applied to the real world, there are always simplifying assumptions made. Otherwise, the problems become intractable. It does not matter what area that you investigate, you will find that assumptions are made to simplify the mathematics. For our purposes, these "simple" equations work, but they are still limited approximations of what we see around us.
        • lisper 9y ago
          > these equations make various simplifying assumptions Not the fundamental equations. Yes, a lot of complexity emerges from those, just like a lot of complexity emerges in the Mandelbrot set. But as far as experiment has been able to determine, the equations of GR and QM are exactly correct.
          • projektir 9y ago
• simonh 9y ago
  Imagine a 'multiplanet' theory, in which there are numerous planets in the universe. Some of them are too cold and dry for life, others too hot, etc. Only a small subset have the right gravity, temperature range, chemistry, etc for life to evolve. We look at fundamental chemistry and find that the most complex and rich chemistry is Carbon chemistry, therefore that's the chemistry that is most likely to support life, and water is the most suitable fluid medium of all known chemicals, and our world happens to be rich on these materials. The deist view on this would be that our planet was custom built by an engineer to support life, as against some natural theory of planet formation. A multiverse theory is no more or less ridiculous or arbitrary than the planet formation theory. The only difference is that we can observe other planets, but cannot observe other possible universes. The deist explanation of creation of the universe is however no more predictively powerful than the theory of planet engineering.
  • EGreg 9y ago
    Well if the deity would reveal its message to us then the theory would be validated. Maybe in the digits of Pi as in the book CONTACT Or perhaps... :)
    • kamaal 9y ago
      Intelligence is just pattern recognition. And such patterns could arise as outputs of random processes happening over billions of years. Sooner or later some intelligent pattern cycle/phenomenon happens. There was a tweet a few months back about a cloud formation resembling the map of United Kingdom. One way of seeing at something like that is saying, there could be no way a cloud formation resembling a complex geographical map on earth without an intelligent species making it. Another way of looking at is given how many billions of years earth has been in existence, eventually clouds could form resembling many things on earth. I wouldn't surprised if we tomorrow discover some sequence of digits in Pi that show these kinds of behavior. In short, over long periods of times, odds of these events happening approaches 1.
• stcredzero 9y ago
  is there any reason not to consider the deist view and say the universe was created with the cosmological constant needed for life to form as an equally likely outcome? Occam's Razor.