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You raise a good point. EnvKey minimizes the number of secrets that you need to deal with, but you still do have to protect ENVKEYs (the access keys that EnvKey
by danenania 9y ago
You raise a good point. EnvKey minimizes the number of secrets that you need to deal with, but you still do have to protect ENVKEYs (the access keys that EnvKey generates).
The idea here is to create a simple 'base layer' for access that can work with any host. Environment variables fit the bill nicely because you'll almost always have some way to set one, and access to these will generally be coupled to server-level access.
That said, I'm definitely interested in adding other options for integration.
For example, I'm currently working on a way to store encrypted configuration in S3 buckets you control instead of in EnvKey's cloud. With this approach, you could define bucket policies (for both development and production-level secrets), that would restrict access by IP or by security group. That way, even if an ENVKEY leaked, it couldn't be used outside of a privileged context.
There are definitely other possibilities too. I'll look into the CNC server approach. Thanks!
- DenisM 9y agoNow that I think of it, you don't even need a CNC server, you can make do with a public FTP site. The client will generate a cert, send it to FTP server, an on-prem app will download it from the FTP, the admin will review the fingerprint and sign the cert with his own key, then the on-prem app will encrypt all secrets with all signed certs and push them back to the FTP server. Substitute FTP for S3/etc as needed.