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The HTTP Public Key Pinning specification says that browsers should/may (I forget which) ignore the pin if the chain ends up at a private locally-installed CA,
by aaronmdjones 9y ago
The HTTP Public Key Pinning specification says that browsers should/may (I forget which) ignore the pin if the chain ends up at a private locally-installed CA, for this very reason.
- aaronmdjones 9y agoIt's also worth mentioning that an MITM proxy with a private CA root certificate could just strip HPKP headers out of any webpage it sends you. If your computer is tied to its network (e.g. corporate PC) it will never see it, so there's no issue.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- throwaway613834 9y agoI'm confused, isn't this the normal criterion for a certificate being valid? If your certificate chain doesn't end in a locally-installed trusted CA then how is that any different from a random cert signed by a nobody off the street?
- tscs37 9y agoThere is a difference between a local CA and a CA part of the root store and/or as part of the system's CA bundle.
- throwaway613834 9y agoSo terminating in a root CA imposes more restrictions than terminating in a non-root CA here? Something about that seems off...
- tscs37 9y agoNot root CA. Root store. A root CA that has been installed by the computer administrator is assumed to be more trustworthy than the one installed by your OS.
- aaronmdjones 9y agoAs tscs37 explained, there's a difference between the CAs that came with your OS/browser by default, and ones you have installed. Pins are usually ignored if the chain ends at the latter, because that's exactly the sort of scenario that would be used for corporate TLS MITM.