4 ms·
> A better position is to use QUIC. Not only is the payload encrypted, but the entire transport flow control is covered by the veil of encryption. I'm not sure
by baby 9y ago
> A better position is to use QUIC. Not only is the payload encrypted, but the entire transport flow control is covered by the veil of encryption.
I'm not sure I understand his/her point. Maybe this is pointing to QUIC encrypting part of the handshake?
- tialaramex 9y agoNot just the handshake. With say HTTPS (HTTP over TLS over TCP) the unencrypted TCP layer is where the flow control is, a bad guy can see and manipulate this flow even though the application data is opaque to them. Every TCP packet is identified as to which session it's part of, and the TCP stack is relying on the flow control to tell it e.g. to slow down because things are congested. In QUIC all that vanishes inside the encryption. The only things left unencrypted are the source and destination address.
- baby 9y agoOh I see what you're saying. Is it really an improvement though? If a bad guy can see and manipulate your TCP flow, he could also just drop packets.
- slrz 9y agoIt's an improvement because middleboxes can't mess up your packets when you're using authenticated encryption. Sure, they can still drop all of them, but that's a much easier problem to debug than otherwise. We have all these problems because a lot of middleboxes crap their pants when they "see" something in the protocol headers that their developers did not consider because it didn't seem to happen on their laptops or whatever. So you make the protocol headers invisible to the network's middleboxes to prevent the middlebox developer's broken mental model about that protocol from breaking your pipes.
- baby 9y agoI see your point. Also, they can still "control" the flow of QUIC (to a lesser degree I'd imagine) by dropping some of the packets.