4 ms·

Does that really not sound ridiculous to you? Microsoft needs to be blamed for their certificate validation implementation because people might use it to make t

Does that really not sound ridiculous to you? Microsoft needs to be blamed for their certificate validation implementation because people might use it to make their software expire? Instead of just writing code that does so?

wtallis 9y ago
Microsoft's driver signing model has a mode that is a giant footgun with no redeeming value. Oculus is a victim of Microsoft's bad design. They weren't trying to build in a self-destruct timer for their whole product stack, and if they were, they wouldn't have used the driver signing certificate as the lynchpin.
- flamedoge 9y ago
  you can't guard against every imaginable stupidity. you try but users will inevitably find a hole.
  - loup-vaillant 9y ago
    That's not how APIs work. You don't eliminate stupidity by thinking of each and every way the user could screw up. You simplify your API so there aren't so many ways to use it in the first place.
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  I find this reasoning ("footgun", Microsoft's fault) interesting when compared to the prevalent HN opinions when it comes to, for example, (unsecured) redis and memcached servers being used in DDoS attacks, or even AWS S3 buckets (with confidential or even highly classified files) being -- inadvertantly -- left wide open to the public. In those cases, "we" (as a "community", in general) often blame the people responsible for running those services instead of the developers (or Amazon) being blamed for choosing convenience/ease-of-use over security. That is, we're often quick to say that the people running those wide open memcached servers are at fault for not properly configuring and/or securing them -- and not blaming the developers for creating "a giant footgun". "You shouldn't be running servers on the Internet if you don't know how to properly configure them" (paraphrasing) is often stated. Yet, in this case, we're not blaming Oculus for their screwup and instead blaming Microsoft -- even though there's zero evidence (AFAIK) that Oculus even used any Microsoft tools to sign their application. (N.B.: I don't know the first thing about code signing on Windows so it may well be that using a Microsoft utility is required and, thus, just assumed by those of you who are familiar with the process. If that's the case, sorry.) I'm having trouble trying to reconcile these two seemingly opposing viewpoints. Why is Microsoft's utility "a giant footgun" but a (OOTB) completely insecure by default, wide open by default memcached server (for example) isn't?
  - girvo 9y ago
    > I'm having trouble trying to reconcile these two seemingly opposing viewpoints. I mean this with all respect... but why? You're talking about different opinions expressed by completely different people. HN isn't a monolith.
    - jlgaddis 9y ago
      Sure, there are plenty of different opinions here on HN. If there wasn't, these discussion threads would be boring and useless. My point was: in most threads, there's a common opinion or viewpoint shared by most, along with a few "detractors". In general, though, the overwhelming "predominant" opinions (within/on a particular subject) are pretty consistent from one thread to the next. For example, the "it's the end user's fault, not the developers" thing I mentioned earlier. That seems to be, pretty consistently, the "belief of the majority". Here, though, it's the complete opposite. Instead of saying "the end user (Oculus) screwed up" (which, IMO, they certainly did, FWIW), it's "Microsoft made a footgun which caused this". That said, I have now made it through the rest of the comments in this thread and it seems that this viewpoint isn't as widespread as it first appeared. Perhaps I just jumped to a conclusion much too quickly; there's obviously plenty of fingers pointing at Oculus as well.
  - wtallis 9y ago
    There's a use case for redis and memcached being open to the network, and a failure mode if you don't properly separate your internal network from the public Internet. There's a use case for S3 buckets that are publicly readable, if they don't contain sensitive/private information. Those features have reason to exist, even though there's potential for misuse. Secure defaults would be nice, but can't eliminate these risks. There's no reason for drivers to have an expiration date. There's no scenario where it makes sense for the configuration that Oculus stumbled into to be possible.
    - jlgaddis 9y ago
      Really? No reason whatsoever? I'm not being facetious, FWIW. I know a fair amount about PKI, in general (probably in more depth and intricate detail than the average HN'er, actually), but I'm not a developer and I know very little about code signing in particular (and even less when it comes to the Microsoft world of code signing). I do find it kinda hard to believe that there's no use case whatsoever for this particular configuration (code signing w/o an included timestamp from a TTP), though. I certainly understand why a timestamp can be valuable (as it would in this case) but what isn't clear is that there is "no scenario" whatsoever where the lack of a timestamp might be acceptable or perhaps even desired. As I said, though, I don't know enough about code signing specifically to know what these scenarios might be but I can't imagine there isn't even one of them.
- ryanlol 9y ago
  So instead of trying to conform to the x.509 spec MS should have just developed their own certificate validation scheme, because that would totally be less of a "footgun" than conforming to the spec. Am I getting this right? Why aren't we blaming the people behind RFC5280, after all it was them who came up with this awful idea that certificates should expire. >giant footgun oh dear god how are you generating your certificates? This is not a footgun unless you are doing something immeasurably stupid before even involving MS products. Besides, if you insist on going ahead and setting the Not After field, wouldn't it be a bigger footgun to ignore that?
  - lclarkmichalek 9y ago
    FWIW, there are basically no common implementations that fully conform to the x.509 spec. That thing is a bundle of unimplemented features.
    - ryanlol 9y ago
      Hence "trying to" :) However, I'd argue that disregarding the Validity section would be an unusually big departure from the spec, not comparable to the typical silliness surrounding x.509.
gambler 9y ago
How about we stop blaming people who accidentally pressed figurative "system self-destruct" button and start asking why there are so many of those buttons everywhere? Nowadays this is a recurring theme. Simple mistakes leading to catastrophic failures at grand scale. "Just be more careful" doesn't cut it anymore, because in the software world there are just too many things to be careful about.
- Twisell 9y ago
  Because when you edit code basically every character you type have the potential to become a big red button. It’s not that developer add them for fun. And each time you develop a new functionality you have to figure out how to build a very solid glass box around the reds buttons you just created. The default being none. Alternatively you could propose no user configurable functionalities whatsoever and rarely and carefully upgrade any dependencies (including the os) and you will create a very robust program. But then don’t expect to end up with a wireless VR headset with an online game catalog and multiplayer capability. No but you can up with a very nice banking application developed in COBOL for sure.
- ryanlol 9y ago
  You cant possibly make this argument in the context of driver development. Everything is a self destruct button.

wtallis 9y ago

Microsoft's driver signing model has a mode that is a giant footgun with no redeeming value. Oculus is a victim of Microsoft's bad design. They weren't trying to build in a self-destruct timer for their whole product stack, and if they were, they wouldn't have used the driver signing certificate as the lynchpin.

flamedoge 9y ago
you can't guard against every imaginable stupidity. you try but users will inevitably find a hole.
- loup-vaillant 9y ago
  That's not how APIs work. You don't eliminate stupidity by thinking of each and every way the user could screw up. You simplify your API so there aren't so many ways to use it in the first place.
jlgaddis 9y ago
I find this reasoning ("footgun", Microsoft's fault) interesting when compared to the prevalent HN opinions when it comes to, for example, (unsecured) redis and memcached servers being used in DDoS attacks, or even AWS S3 buckets (with confidential or even highly classified files) being -- inadvertantly -- left wide open to the public. In those cases, "we" (as a "community", in general) often blame the people responsible for running those services instead of the developers (or Amazon) being blamed for choosing convenience/ease-of-use over security. That is, we're often quick to say that the people running those wide open memcached servers are at fault for not properly configuring and/or securing them -- and not blaming the developers for creating "a giant footgun". "You shouldn't be running servers on the Internet if you don't know how to properly configure them" (paraphrasing) is often stated. Yet, in this case, we're not blaming Oculus for their screwup and instead blaming Microsoft -- even though there's zero evidence (AFAIK) that Oculus even used any Microsoft tools to sign their application. (N.B.: I don't know the first thing about code signing on Windows so it may well be that using a Microsoft utility is required and, thus, just assumed by those of you who are familiar with the process. If that's the case, sorry.) I'm having trouble trying to reconcile these two seemingly opposing viewpoints. Why is Microsoft's utility "a giant footgun" but a (OOTB) completely insecure by default, wide open by default memcached server (for example) isn't?
- girvo 9y ago
  > I'm having trouble trying to reconcile these two seemingly opposing viewpoints. I mean this with all respect... but why? You're talking about different opinions expressed by completely different people. HN isn't a monolith.
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    Sure, there are plenty of different opinions here on HN. If there wasn't, these discussion threads would be boring and useless. My point was: in most threads, there's a common opinion or viewpoint shared by most, along with a few "detractors". In general, though, the overwhelming "predominant" opinions (within/on a particular subject) are pretty consistent from one thread to the next. For example, the "it's the end user's fault, not the developers" thing I mentioned earlier. That seems to be, pretty consistently, the "belief of the majority". Here, though, it's the complete opposite. Instead of saying "the end user (Oculus) screwed up" (which, IMO, they certainly did, FWIW), it's "Microsoft made a footgun which caused this". That said, I have now made it through the rest of the comments in this thread and it seems that this viewpoint isn't as widespread as it first appeared. Perhaps I just jumped to a conclusion much too quickly; there's obviously plenty of fingers pointing at Oculus as well.
- wtallis 9y ago
  There's a use case for redis and memcached being open to the network, and a failure mode if you don't properly separate your internal network from the public Internet. There's a use case for S3 buckets that are publicly readable, if they don't contain sensitive/private information. Those features have reason to exist, even though there's potential for misuse. Secure defaults would be nice, but can't eliminate these risks. There's no reason for drivers to have an expiration date. There's no scenario where it makes sense for the configuration that Oculus stumbled into to be possible.
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    Really? No reason whatsoever? I'm not being facetious, FWIW. I know a fair amount about PKI, in general (probably in more depth and intricate detail than the average HN'er, actually), but I'm not a developer and I know very little about code signing in particular (and even less when it comes to the Microsoft world of code signing). I do find it kinda hard to believe that there's no use case whatsoever for this particular configuration (code signing w/o an included timestamp from a TTP), though. I certainly understand why a timestamp can be valuable (as it would in this case) but what isn't clear is that there is "no scenario" whatsoever where the lack of a timestamp might be acceptable or perhaps even desired. As I said, though, I don't know enough about code signing specifically to know what these scenarios might be but I can't imagine there isn't even one of them.
ryanlol 9y ago
So instead of trying to conform to the x.509 spec MS should have just developed their own certificate validation scheme, because that would totally be less of a "footgun" than conforming to the spec. Am I getting this right? Why aren't we blaming the people behind RFC5280, after all it was them who came up with this awful idea that certificates should expire. >giant footgun oh dear god how are you generating your certificates? This is not a footgun unless you are doing something immeasurably stupid before even involving MS products. Besides, if you insist on going ahead and setting the Not After field, wouldn't it be a bigger footgun to ignore that?
- lclarkmichalek 9y ago
  FWIW, there are basically no common implementations that fully conform to the x.509 spec. That thing is a bundle of unimplemented features.
  - ryanlol 9y ago
    Hence "trying to" :) However, I'd argue that disregarding the Validity section would be an unusually big departure from the spec, not comparable to the typical silliness surrounding x.509.

gambler 9y ago

How about we stop blaming people who accidentally pressed figurative "system self-destruct" button and start asking why there are so many of those buttons everywhere? Nowadays this is a recurring theme. Simple mistakes leading to catastrophic failures at grand scale. "Just be more careful" doesn't cut it anymore, because in the software world there are just too many things to be careful about.

Twisell 9y ago
Because when you edit code basically every character you type have the potential to become a big red button. It’s not that developer add them for fun. And each time you develop a new functionality you have to figure out how to build a very solid glass box around the reds buttons you just created. The default being none. Alternatively you could propose no user configurable functionalities whatsoever and rarely and carefully upgrade any dependencies (including the os) and you will create a very robust program. But then don’t expect to end up with a wireless VR headset with an online game catalog and multiplayer capability. No but you can up with a very nice banking application developed in COBOL for sure.
ryanlol 9y ago
You cant possibly make this argument in the context of driver development. Everything is a self destruct button.