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I really wanted to like Matrix but it expects you to independently verify the keys for each device every person is using. If they get a new device, new keys to
by LeoPanthera 9y ago
I really wanted to like Matrix but it expects you to independently verify the keys for each device every person is using. If they get a new device, new keys to verify.
This is crazy. The keys should be per person, not per device.
- cyphar 9y agoMatrix has an identity key that is shared between devices (hence why you can link up the sub-devices). The reason for having per-device keys used for e2ee that you can verify is so that you don't automatically trust new devices if a users' account is compromised. Each new login creates new e2e keys that only persist with the session. In terms of UX this system is currently pretty ugly, but the actual concept makes sense. If you want to just trust that the other users' account hasn't been compromised (which is what having a system designed around a single per-user key would effectively mean) then you can just blindly accept all keys, because each device key is first registered with the identity service and signed (requiring access to the account's identity key). To be clear, there are several hiccups with e2e at the moment, but they are being worked on (from what I can tell).
- bb88 9y ago> In terms of UX this system is currently pretty ugly, but the actual concept makes sense. This seems like a trivial gain for lousy UX, since it's possible the account and the device is compromised.
- cyphar 9y agoThey are working on the UX side of things. I disagree that it's a trivial gain. Signal works in the same way, except that they only really support having a single device (that's where the safety number changing warning comes from). Having per-device keys also means that the server cannot decrypt your messages (because the identity key is not used for communication, it's just used to register new keys that clients will encrypt their messages to). Having a global decryption key stored on the server would be a less secure design.
- evrydayhustling 9y agoThis is an example of the kind of business problem Slack is solving incredibly well relative to {chat client X}. Slack's not just a Slack client, it's user lifecycle management, tiered administration, a granular permission model for integrated applications, etc etc etc. How you solve those problems impacts and is impacted by the messaging protocol. If Slack is going to keep moving fast on features that matter for businesses, they're likely to keep needing protocol features that wouldn't necessarily be the priority for an open standard.
- def_true_false 9y agoThis is an example of the kind of business problem Slack isn't solving at all. Or did they add e2e encryption recently?
- Spivak 9y agoThe people who pay aren't asking for E2E. They're asking for auditable shared history. We're in a forums of tech nerds, outside of our bubble encryption is pretty low on the feature totem pole.
- cyphar 9y agoHow do explain the rising usage of Telegram/WhatsApp/Signal, if encryption isn't important to people? I find that most people actually do care about their privacy, but they want it to be made easy for them as well.
- _Tev 9y agoI know plenty of people using Whatsapp and no people caring at all about its approach to privacy. I have not heard of those other two platforms outside of privacy-obsessed communities. Are real usage data disproving my anecdata?
- def_true_false 9y ago
- Arathorn 9y agoTotally agreed that it is crazy; we are working on automatically crosssigning keys between devices, but suffering from rising traffic levels on Matrix meaning that all our effort is getting diverted into fixing scaling issues to keep the bigger homeservers running. Recent funding means that we can increase the paid team to fix it, but we are waiting for folks to serve out notice periods elsewhere before they can start full time. So if you want to help improve our crypto UX please jobs@matrix.org O:-)