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While I agree with some of your points much of what you say is unnecessarily simplistic and partisan. As John Prados writes “what actually happened was more com

While I agree with some of your points much of what you say is unnecessarily simplistic and partisan. As John Prados writes “what actually happened was more complex.” This article is about the details of what actually happened not revisiting political arguments from the 1960s and 1970s. John Prados is no “Vietnam revisionist” or right-winger. If you read his main book on Vietnam War, “Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975”, you will learn that he was actually an anti-war activist during the war. He later became one of our top military historians and has written several books on the Vietnam war. Prados is particularly known for his advocacy for openness in government records. This article draws from once secret documents that Prados helped uncover and declassify. Lastly it is almost universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster for the NVA/Viet Cong and huge win for ARVN/US forces. This is a common refrain in the most histories of the war and this NYTimes series, Vietnam ‘67. The political debates about the war are separate matters.

wahern 9y ago
universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster Does it really make sense to try to distinguish military success from the political consequences? The notion that those things are gainfully distinguishable seems horribly flawed and can be found at the root of our foreign policy and military blunders. It's sort of like talking about how technology A is better than technology B without giving any consideration to market viability, path dependency, etc. Someone who appreciates and emphasizes the latter will almost always see greater success than someone who focuses on the "best" technology. What's worse is when someone bitterly complains about how their startup failed even though they had the better technology. Not only did they fail in the market, but they don't even understand why they failed, which is that realistically there's no objective "better" technology independent from market dynamics. Likewise, there can exist no objective military "success" if the political consequences result in the campaign ultimately crumbling. Another way to put it is that given the American strategic posture, the only to have seen success in the Tet Offensive would have been to have been more prepared and taken many fewer casualties such that the public would have never wavered in its support. That may seem an unfair benchmark, but war isn't fair. If you're going to win a war, you have to understand how wars are won. You not only go to war with the army you have instead of the army you wish you had, you go to war with the public support you have, not the public support you wish you had. If the public is fickle, you better make sure you account for that. Otherwise you'll fail.

wahern 9y ago

universally acknowledged that the Tet Offensive was militarily a disaster Does it really make sense to try to distinguish military success from the political consequences? The notion that those things are gainfully distinguishable seems horribly flawed and can be found at the root of our foreign policy and military blunders. It's sort of like talking about how technology A is better than technology B without giving any consideration to market viability, path dependency, etc. Someone who appreciates and emphasizes the latter will almost always see greater success than someone who focuses on the "best" technology. What's worse is when someone bitterly complains about how their startup failed even though they had the better technology. Not only did they fail in the market, but they don't even understand why they failed, which is that realistically there's no objective "better" technology independent from market dynamics. Likewise, there can exist no objective military "success" if the political consequences result in the campaign ultimately crumbling. Another way to put it is that given the American strategic posture, the only to have seen success in the Tet Offensive would have been to have been more prepared and taken many fewer casualties such that the public would have never wavered in its support. That may seem an unfair benchmark, but war isn't fair. If you're going to win a war, you have to understand how wars are won. You not only go to war with the army you have instead of the army you wish you had, you go to war with the public support you have, not the public support you wish you had. If the public is fickle, you better make sure you account for that. Otherwise you'll fail.