> The fix for the second attack involved limiting the number of outgoing connections a target can make to the same /24 chunk of IP address to 10. The changes ar

> The fix for the second attack involved limiting the number of outgoing connections a target can make to the same /24 chunk of IP address to 10. The changes are designed to make it significantly harder to completely isolate a user from other legitimate users. Maybe it is the way the article is written, or how I've read it, but the original flaw involved just 2 nodes w/ 2 IP address. This fix sounds like you need 2 nodes w/ 2 IP addresses that don't have the same /24 octal? Is it that much more difficult? > When even a single node presents users with a different version of the blockchain, they will be warned of an error that effectively defeats the attack. Doesn't this just mean the attacker has to make sure to control all 13 connections before starting the attack?