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Oops Trustico server allows arbitrary RCE incl root shell: https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258 https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768
by DyslexicAtheist 9y ago
Oops Trustico server allows arbitrary RCE incl root shell: https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258 https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258
see also https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/BLvabFwcJqo https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security...
- DyslexicAtheist 9y agodid they really generate the certificate pair server-side? pkiJS / WebCrypto² API are a keygen¹ replacement so that you can let the browser generate the certificate pair client-side. If the user isn't informed that key generation happens locally then maybe it looks as if the certificate is "downloaded". But with these methods when implemented correctly, certificates never goes to the server (and is saved locally). I'm not a fan of the above approach even though Mozilla sells it as safe: e.g. internal direct access to the OS RNG (instead of doing it in JavaScript Math-random() which led to a lot of critic throughout history of browser based crypto) , since the browser is still a sandbox, and IMO unsuitable for private key storage (even just for a few seconds). Would be interesting to know how trustico implemented this. It's somehow so crazy and negligent a thing to imagine. There is no explanation to why they didn't just implement it using standard software stacks for PKI (primekey has a jboss thing they could have used). Literally copy/pasting things from SO or some example code found in the manuals from WebCrypto would have been better than what they did. These guys have "trust" literally in their name. EDIT: Tippfehler __ ¹ https://github.com/w3ctag/wiki/wiki/keygen https://github.com/w3ctag/wiki/wiki/keygen ² https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Crypto_API https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Crypto_...
- nolok 9y ago> These guys have "trust" literally in their name. Generally speaking, this is more a red flag than an endorsement.
- SilasX 9y agoStupid question: I thought it was accepted practice [1] to generate the private key server-side so long as you don't store after the user's downloaded it? (Not that Trustico followed that part either.) [1] though not something I would endorse!
- slrz 9y agoWhy would it be? It's going to end up in lots of places it's not supposed to be. Better generate the private key where it's needed and never have it leave the system.
- SilasX 9y agoI said I don't endorse it and don't think it's a good idea but e.g. you can have AWS generate your private key (for SSH though not for a cert AFAIK) with the warning that they can't recover it if you lose it. I just figured there might be some compromise to accommodate users who don't know how to generate their own.
- Sukotto 9y agoI propose a new term: "Clown Car" security. For situations like this where a fiasco just keeps getting worse, each step its own facepalm. * Asking users to generate private keys on the issuer's server * Storing those private keys * Emailing those private keys * Sending that email completely in the clear * Running unsanitized user input on their server * as root (Copying my comment from the other thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16492284 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16492284)