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> The Japanese haven't displayed any aggressive policies since 1945. That is not at all the view of Japan in East Asia. Their neighbors, including S. Korea and

> The Japanese haven't displayed any aggressive policies since 1945. That is not at all the view of Japan in East Asia. Their neighbors, including S. Korea and China, distrust and even hate Japan to an extreme extent. For example, S. Korea recently negotiated military cooperation with Japan against N. Korea, but had to cancel it due to public outcry against deals with Japan. Japan is not viewed like Germany; Japan is viewed as unrepentant about WWII, unapologetic, and restrained only by the US and the East Asian order that depends (or depended) on the US providing security so that the countries there didn't get caught in an arms race to protect themselves from Japan (and vice versa), and run a high risk of wars due to the high levels of distrust and hostility. That view has some basis in fact. Germany took full responsibility for its crimes, has major museums and memorials addressing them, outlaws Nazis, teach their children about their evils (AFAIK), transformed their country, is tied tightly in excellent relationships with its neighbors via the EU and NATO, and now feels a responsibility to be a leader in human rights. Japan has made some apologies which their neighbors feel are equivocal (though the neighbors have their own biases), but AFAIK they haven't done much more. Now their textbooks teach a revisionist history that whitewashes the war (based on a few articles I've read) and right-wing nationalists, who deny the crimes and praise the war, are gaining power. This disruption is greatly magnified by the U.S.'s withdrawal from its security guarantees, China's expansion, and North Korea's nuclear weapons - all giving everyone there existential considerations. Japan's military expansion is a long-predicted step in a process that wiser people have strenuously avoided since WWII; it begins with nationalism, in the US and E. Asia, and ends very badly. > may even provide deterrence against others' destabilizing moves in the region This idea seems to be the first mistake everyone makes about international relations. Escalation doesn't deter escalation, it incites more. The other side won't cower, they will react in fear and/or anger to protect themselves. If you bought a knife to protect yourself against your dangerous neighbor and then your neighbor escalated and bought a gun, would you just say 'oh well' and capitulate? In reality, maybe you'd call the police, but there are no international police; maybe you'd move, but countries are stuck with their neighbors forever; so now what? You're stuck next to this armed crazy person. So you buy a gun and both sides become even more scared, inviting yet more escalation and overreactions. The original escalation provided no additional security; it cost both sides money and made the situation even more unstable and dangerous. The mission of international relations is to not let B-level conflicts turn into A-level conflicts (said some expert whose name I can't remember).

skmurphy 9y ago
"escalation does not deter escalation" I think there are examples both ways. Hiroshima, Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crisis, involved escalations that were not met with further escalation.
- forapurpose 9y ago
  > I think there are examples both ways. Hiroshima, Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crisis, involved escalations that were not met with further escalation. Sure, nothing is 100%, but to address the parent point in detail: First, there's a logical inevitability to that statement. If escalation never stopped, then the tiniest diplomatic insult would eventually result in nuclear war. If the diplomats do their job and the politicians listen, issues are deescalated whenever possible. It'd definitely possible to do. The point is that each escalation tends to increase danger for both sides; due to second-order effects, it's bad for the escalator. Second, I think escalation does sometimes work when the escalator has such superior power that their enemy can't hope to match it. In the mid-1990s, China threatened Taiwan with missile launches. The U.S. sailed a couple aircraft carrier battle groups through the Taiwan Strait, a massive show of force that China couldn't hope to match at the time (they were militarily much less capable than now), and China backed down. On the other hand, China didn't back down: China felt humiliated and that event instigated the current decades-long military buildup in China, with a primary focus on the prevention of US aircraft carriers from intervening in Taiwan and naval control of nearby seas. Now the situation is more dangerous than ever, for Taiwan, China, and the US. Finally, I don't think the examples in the parent support the case (though I'm sure there are examples that do). Hiroshima: This event was during total war, when maximum escalation already had happened years before. Both sides were throwing everything they had at each other; one side happened to have more. (Also, the Japanese didn't surrender after Hiroshima.) Cuban Missile Crisis: A prime example of the dangers of escalation; humanity almost was destroyed by nuclear weapons due to the brinkmanship of both sides. The USSR put nuclear weapons in Cuba, a clear escalation, and the US implemented a blockade to stop it; (both?) sides threatened war. It ended in a secret deal where the USSR removed its missiles from Cuba and the U.S. secretly removed theirs from Turkey. But I think the definition of escalation is tricky here: Putting the missiles in Cuba was an escalation, and the results matched the theory in the GP: It increased danger for both sides and achieved nothing. I'm not sure the US blockade was an escalation or a non-escalating response; e.g., an obvious escalation would have been for the US to put twice as many nuclear missiles on the USSR border as the USSR put in Cuba, and IMHO it's likely that such a (hypothetical) escalation would have again increased danger with no benefit. Berlin Air Lift: That's an example of the opposite, a non-escalating response. When the USSR blockaded Berlin (a West German city surrounded by East German territory, other than a channel to W. Germany), the US (or was it NATO?) didn't respond by attacking the blockade or by blockading USSR cities; they simply flew in supplies around the clock until the blockade ended. They accomplished the goal without increasing the threat to the USSR.

skmurphy 9y ago

"escalation does not deter escalation" I think there are examples both ways. Hiroshima, Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crisis, involved escalations that were not met with further escalation.

forapurpose 9y ago
> I think there are examples both ways. Hiroshima, Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crisis, involved escalations that were not met with further escalation. Sure, nothing is 100%, but to address the parent point in detail: First, there's a logical inevitability to that statement. If escalation never stopped, then the tiniest diplomatic insult would eventually result in nuclear war. If the diplomats do their job and the politicians listen, issues are deescalated whenever possible. It'd definitely possible to do. The point is that each escalation tends to increase danger for both sides; due to second-order effects, it's bad for the escalator. Second, I think escalation does sometimes work when the escalator has such superior power that their enemy can't hope to match it. In the mid-1990s, China threatened Taiwan with missile launches. The U.S. sailed a couple aircraft carrier battle groups through the Taiwan Strait, a massive show of force that China couldn't hope to match at the time (they were militarily much less capable than now), and China backed down. On the other hand, China didn't back down: China felt humiliated and that event instigated the current decades-long military buildup in China, with a primary focus on the prevention of US aircraft carriers from intervening in Taiwan and naval control of nearby seas. Now the situation is more dangerous than ever, for Taiwan, China, and the US. Finally, I don't think the examples in the parent support the case (though I'm sure there are examples that do). Hiroshima: This event was during total war, when maximum escalation already had happened years before. Both sides were throwing everything they had at each other; one side happened to have more. (Also, the Japanese didn't surrender after Hiroshima.) Cuban Missile Crisis: A prime example of the dangers of escalation; humanity almost was destroyed by nuclear weapons due to the brinkmanship of both sides. The USSR put nuclear weapons in Cuba, a clear escalation, and the US implemented a blockade to stop it; (both?) sides threatened war. It ended in a secret deal where the USSR removed its missiles from Cuba and the U.S. secretly removed theirs from Turkey. But I think the definition of escalation is tricky here: Putting the missiles in Cuba was an escalation, and the results matched the theory in the GP: It increased danger for both sides and achieved nothing. I'm not sure the US blockade was an escalation or a non-escalating response; e.g., an obvious escalation would have been for the US to put twice as many nuclear missiles on the USSR border as the USSR put in Cuba, and IMHO it's likely that such a (hypothetical) escalation would have again increased danger with no benefit. Berlin Air Lift: That's an example of the opposite, a non-escalating response. When the USSR blockaded Berlin (a West German city surrounded by East German territory, other than a channel to W. Germany), the US (or was it NATO?) didn't respond by attacking the blockade or by blockading USSR cities; they simply flew in supplies around the clock until the blockade ended. They accomplished the goal without increasing the threat to the USSR.