8 ms·

They have a tool that allows you create a private key + CSR https://www.trustico.com/ssltools/create/csr-pem/create-a-new-csr-instantly.php https://www.trustic

They have a tool that allows you create a private key + CSR https://www.trustico.com/ssltools/create/csr-pem/create-a-new-csr-instantly.php https://www.trustico.com/ssltools/create/csr-pem/create-a-ne... Apparently they decided to keep a copy of the private key. Edit: Looks like they are having problems atm. A copy can be found at https://web.archive.org/web/20180217071027/https://www.trustico.com/ssltools/create/csr-pem/create-a-new-csr-instantly.php https://web.archive.org/web/20180217071027/https://www.trust...

dx034 9y ago
This probably happened because they allowed users to execute root commands on their server. Either they quickly shut down the site or someone else did it by shutting down some servers. > https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258 https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258
- jiggliemon 9y ago
  Oh my. There must be some sort of hall of fame for security vulnerabilities. And this belongs in it. Perhaps they’re passing this command to a secured container? I shouldn’t make excuses for them, but passing root commands to the shell seems too far out there.
  - zbentley 9y ago
    > root commands to the shell seems too far out there You haven't been in software too long, have ya? /s Glibness aside (and I meant the above as a joke, not a personal attack), this is distressingly common to the point of being near-universal in some areas of our industry.
  - profmonocle 9y ago
    > Perhaps they’re passing this command to a secured container? That would indicate they were concerned about shell injection while writing the code. But if that were true, why would they skip the much simpler step of sanitizing/escaping the input?
  - chopin 9y ago
    This seems more to warrant a business Darwin Award.
  - peterwwillis 9y ago
    > There must be some sort of hall of fame for security vulnerabilities. It's called the Pwnie Awards. https://pwnies.com/ https://pwnies.com/
  - cyphar 9y ago
    > Perhaps they’re passing this command to a secured container? This would still raise my eyebrows, since root inside a container is still something you should avoid unless absolutely necessary (especially if they aren't using user namespaces). Just because containers add some newer security features to regular processes doesn't mean you should forget the security features (POSIX DAC) that were there in the first place.
cjalmeida 9y ago
Worse yet, the tool seems to run JS on the client side and the page includes JS code from 5 different sources, including ad companies. Any of them can capture the generated key.
blattimwind 9y ago
Up until a few years ago there was a <keygen> tag which embedded a x509 CSR generator into a regular HTML form. The private key was generated by the browser(1) and was completely inaccessible to the site or any JS running on it. That's the proper way to generate certificates in browsers, but it's been removed since and was never supported in IE. StartSSL used it, for example, but also allowed you to hand them a CSR of your own making. Although they of course ignored almost everything in the CSR apart from the public key (which is probably a good idea). (1) IIRC you could even have a smartcard generate the key, at least in theory.
- LoSboccacc 9y ago
  they didn't support the tag but you could do the same using activex components, seen once one vpn enrollment website doing that.
- kevin_thibedeau 9y ago
  It can't be that hard to whip up a cross platform Qt app that streamlines the keygen and CSR process in a user friendly fashion. Maybe throw in some dodgy key escrow service for the daring. Why does everything have to be done over the web.
  - icebraining 9y ago
    It already exists, e.g. https://www.digicert.com/util/ https://www.digicert.com/util/ The problem is, people who don't understand the issue will prefer a solution that doesn't require installing some software.
- tialaramex 9y ago
  You say "they of course ignored almost everything in the CSR apart from the public key" but it turns out they went a bit further than that, they also ignored the signature on the CSR. So you could put some other public key in there, add a bogus signature that wouldn't verify and they'd issue certificates for a key you never even controlled. The bad security implications for that scenario are a bit subtle, and situational, but CAs are supposed to be checking that the CSR is properly signed, that's only a long way down the list because StartCom/ WoSign had so many other serious problems.

dx034 9y ago

This probably happened because they allowed users to execute root commands on their server. Either they quickly shut down the site or someone else did it by shutting down some servers. > https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258 https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258

jiggliemon 9y ago
Oh my. There must be some sort of hall of fame for security vulnerabilities. And this belongs in it. Perhaps they’re passing this command to a secured container? I shouldn’t make excuses for them, but passing root commands to the shell seems too far out there.
- zbentley 9y ago
  > root commands to the shell seems too far out there You haven't been in software too long, have ya? /s Glibness aside (and I meant the above as a joke, not a personal attack), this is distressingly common to the point of being near-universal in some areas of our industry.
- profmonocle 9y ago
  > Perhaps they’re passing this command to a secured container? That would indicate they were concerned about shell injection while writing the code. But if that were true, why would they skip the much simpler step of sanitizing/escaping the input?
- chopin 9y ago
  This seems more to warrant a business Darwin Award.
- peterwwillis 9y ago
  > There must be some sort of hall of fame for security vulnerabilities. It's called the Pwnie Awards. https://pwnies.com/ https://pwnies.com/
- cyphar 9y ago
  > Perhaps they’re passing this command to a secured container? This would still raise my eyebrows, since root inside a container is still something you should avoid unless absolutely necessary (especially if they aren't using user namespaces). Just because containers add some newer security features to regular processes doesn't mean you should forget the security features (POSIX DAC) that were there in the first place.

cjalmeida 9y ago

Worse yet, the tool seems to run JS on the client side and the page includes JS code from 5 different sources, including ad companies. Any of them can capture the generated key.

blattimwind 9y ago

Up until a few years ago there was a <keygen> tag which embedded a x509 CSR generator into a regular HTML form. The private key was generated by the browser(1) and was completely inaccessible to the site or any JS running on it. That's the proper way to generate certificates in browsers, but it's been removed since and was never supported in IE. StartSSL used it, for example, but also allowed you to hand them a CSR of your own making. Although they of course ignored almost everything in the CSR apart from the public key (which is probably a good idea). (1) IIRC you could even have a smartcard generate the key, at least in theory.

LoSboccacc 9y ago
they didn't support the tag but you could do the same using activex components, seen once one vpn enrollment website doing that.
kevin_thibedeau 9y ago
It can't be that hard to whip up a cross platform Qt app that streamlines the keygen and CSR process in a user friendly fashion. Maybe throw in some dodgy key escrow service for the daring. Why does everything have to be done over the web.
- icebraining 9y ago
  It already exists, e.g. https://www.digicert.com/util/ https://www.digicert.com/util/ The problem is, people who don't understand the issue will prefer a solution that doesn't require installing some software.
tialaramex 9y ago
You say "they of course ignored almost everything in the CSR apart from the public key" but it turns out they went a bit further than that, they also ignored the signature on the CSR. So you could put some other public key in there, add a bogus signature that wouldn't verify and they'd issue certificates for a key you never even controlled. The bad security implications for that scenario are a bit subtle, and situational, but CAs are supposed to be checking that the CSR is properly signed, that's only a long way down the list because StartCom/ WoSign had so many other serious problems.