2 ms·

The mozilla.dev.security.policy thread linked in the article is a much better read: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/wxX4Yv0

by lima 9y ago

The mozilla.dev.security.policy thread linked in the article is a much better read: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/wxX4Yv0E3Mk https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security... tl;dr: Trustico told Digicert that all 50k of their certificates should be revoked, without specifying a reason as to why they were compromised. 50k is a LOT of certificates, so Digicert asked for details. Trustico then sent Digicert the private keys, and Digicert said "Welp, guess now they're compromised".

lima 9y ago
> Finally -- the CSR/key generation form page incorporates JavaScript from at least 5 or 6 different companies (including ad servers), which would allow any of those third parties (intentionally or through compromise of their own) to capture generated keys. This is a reckless amount of exposure, to the point that even if the keys were generated completely inside the browser and never exposed to the server (which does not appear to be the case), I would consider them compromised at the time of generation. Also, wow. That's extremely reckless.
- Bartweiss 9y ago
  Jesus. That means it's not just about "offering revocation" and storing them on the wrong side; even people who didn't use that option are completely compromised.
  - tialaramex 9y ago
    If you generated your own Private Key and used that to make one or more CSRs, you can show any fool the CSR and no harm will come to you, at least on the cryptographic side. Upload it to 4chan, print it out on a T-shirt, doesn't matter. Any certificates produced are worthless to everybody except you, because you have the Private Key, and a _competent_ Certificate Authority (in this story that's Symantec or DigiCert, not Trustico) should only issue certificates for the names requested in the CSR, not any other names. A customer who did things sensibly (their own Private Key, make a CSR etcetera) and used Trustico say in 2016, needn't be concerned that these development will end with their certificates unilaterally revoked on Trustico's say-so. They might not want to do any more business with Trustico, but there's no particular reason this incident should affect their feelings about DigiCert or Comodo or any of the Symantec brands (Verisign / Thawte / RapidSSL / etcetera) now controlled by DigiCert.
drakenot 9y ago
> Currently, we are only revoking the certificates if we received the private keys. There are additional certificates the reseller requested to have revoked, but DigiCert has decided to disregard that request until we receive proof of compromise or more information about the cause of this incident. I feel like given Trustico's behavior and the fact they already emailed 23k private keys to Digicert, I would just be conservative and revoke them all. Why leave the other ~25k keys when Trustico has specifically stated they are compromised?

by lima 9y ago

lima 9y ago

> Finally -- the CSR/key generation form page incorporates JavaScript from at least 5 or 6 different companies (including ad servers), which would allow any of those third parties (intentionally or through compromise of their own) to capture generated keys. This is a reckless amount of exposure, to the point that even if the keys were generated completely inside the browser and never exposed to the server (which does not appear to be the case), I would consider them compromised at the time of generation. Also, wow. That's extremely reckless.

Bartweiss 9y ago
Jesus. That means it's not just about "offering revocation" and storing them on the wrong side; even people who didn't use that option are completely compromised.
- tialaramex 9y ago
  If you generated your own Private Key and used that to make one or more CSRs, you can show any fool the CSR and no harm will come to you, at least on the cryptographic side. Upload it to 4chan, print it out on a T-shirt, doesn't matter. Any certificates produced are worthless to everybody except you, because you have the Private Key, and a _competent_ Certificate Authority (in this story that's Symantec or DigiCert, not Trustico) should only issue certificates for the names requested in the CSR, not any other names. A customer who did things sensibly (their own Private Key, make a CSR etcetera) and used Trustico say in 2016, needn't be concerned that these development will end with their certificates unilaterally revoked on Trustico's say-so. They might not want to do any more business with Trustico, but there's no particular reason this incident should affect their feelings about DigiCert or Comodo or any of the Symantec brands (Verisign / Thawte / RapidSSL / etcetera) now controlled by DigiCert.

drakenot 9y ago

> Currently, we are only revoking the certificates if we received the private keys. There are additional certificates the reseller requested to have revoked, but DigiCert has decided to disregard that request until we receive proof of compromise or more information about the cause of this incident. I feel like given Trustico's behavior and the fact they already emailed 23k private keys to Digicert, I would just be conservative and revoke them all. Why leave the other ~25k keys when Trustico has specifically stated they are compromised?