3 ms·
>My point really wasn’t about the MITM but a there’s always a possibility that a proxy on a public/compromised network can intervene between you and a “secured”
by ktta 9y ago
>My point really wasn’t about the MITM but a there’s always a possibility that a proxy on a public/compromised network can intervene between you and a “secured” website.
Same can happen to a binary.
>Binaries can be verified with checksums to make sure that the artifact hosted on the repository is indeed what you received
Here's the problem. The checksum is usually on the same page the binary is located. Which pretty much defeats the purpose.
- merlinsbrain 9y agoI see, and this was your original point. I guess the only threat there (that I can see) is that the install script can be malicious, but your point was that you’re trusting the owners of the website anyway by downloading their binary and executing their code locally. It can be argued that it’s probably easier to ship malicious code outside the main repository (e.g. in an install script) but I do not have a good counter besides this weak argument. The checksum is indeed usually on the same page and does make it useless in my hypothetical MITM.