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>>Consider a different example: someone participates in adding threading to the C++ standard. They then get hired at a development tools company to help impleme

>>Consider a different example: someone participates in adding threading to the C++ standard. They then get hired at a development tools company to help implement the standard. Anything unseemly there? Code is objective and apolitical. Regulatory enforcement is a people business, and having the right people on your team can affect how regulatory agencies treat you, irrespective of your actual conduct vis-à-vis the regulations. An open standard can also be studied by anyone. The secret rules and customs of regulatory agencies are only privy to those who worked in the agencies. >>Second, the industry welcomes some level of regulation, in order to reestablish trust with consumers that might otherwise be scared off. Third, regulation gets implemented on the premise that its good for both consumers and for the industry, because it allows the industry to overcome trust barriers. I suspect that is not the main reason industry players support regulations. I think it's far more likely that their support is motivated by a desire to create regulatory moats to competition. An example of this would be the "Money Services Round Table": http://www.aarongreenspan.com/writing/20110510/in-fifty-days-payments-innovation-will-stop-in-silicon-valley/ http://www.aarongreenspan.com/writing/20110510/in-fifty-days... There is empirical evidence that regulations exacerbate income inequality: https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/McLaughlin-Regulation-Income-Inequality.pdf https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/McLaughlin-Regulation-... This supports the 'lobbying for regulations as an anticompetitive measure' thesis.

rayiner 9y ago
> Code is objective and apolitical. Hardly. Code can be intensely political (competing standards championed by competing companies, etc.). > An open standard can also be studied by anyone. The secret rules and customs of regulatory agencies are only privy to those who worked in the agencies. Regulatory agencies are for the most part incredibly transparent organizations. Nobody has any insight into what happens when a Google executive talks to an Apple executive about a web standard. But when an industry executive meets with a federal agency commissioner to discuss a new rule, a detailed notice and summary of the ex parte contact will be published. Agencies conduct their business in intensely public notice-and-comment procedures. > I suspect that is not the main reason industry players support regulations. I think it's far more likely that their support is motivated by a desire to create regulatory moats to competition. And your speculation is based on? > This supports the 'lobbying for regulations as an anticompetitive measure' thesis. A lot of regulation is bad. E.g. zoning regulations. But for the most part they're bad because regulators and constituents have bad ideas, not because there are shadowy cabals at work.
- CryptoPunk 9y ago
  >>Hardly. Code can be intensely political (competing standards championed by competing companies, etc.). The decision to make a particular segment of code the standard can be political, but the effective utilization of that code within a project once it has become the standard, has no political element to it. >>Regulatory agencies are for the most part incredibly transparent organizations. That is not the impression I get from the many complaints I've seen from those trying to navigate the regulatory framework. Of course I haven't done a comprehensive/rigorous study of this topic so my impression may not be an accurate representation of reality. I also find it hard to believe that a legalistic (as opposed to programmatic) domain like regulatory enforcement does not have a significant human element that cannot be fully articulated in formal notices and procedures. >>And your speculation is based on? On the fact that there is a very large rent-seeking opportunity in enacting regulatory barriers to entry, as demonstrated by the impact regulations have on income inequality (which is a consequence of economic rent accruing to those at the top of the industry ladder).

rayiner 9y ago

> Code is objective and apolitical. Hardly. Code can be intensely political (competing standards championed by competing companies, etc.). > An open standard can also be studied by anyone. The secret rules and customs of regulatory agencies are only privy to those who worked in the agencies. Regulatory agencies are for the most part incredibly transparent organizations. Nobody has any insight into what happens when a Google executive talks to an Apple executive about a web standard. But when an industry executive meets with a federal agency commissioner to discuss a new rule, a detailed notice and summary of the ex parte contact will be published. Agencies conduct their business in intensely public notice-and-comment procedures. > I suspect that is not the main reason industry players support regulations. I think it's far more likely that their support is motivated by a desire to create regulatory moats to competition. And your speculation is based on? > This supports the 'lobbying for regulations as an anticompetitive measure' thesis. A lot of regulation is bad. E.g. zoning regulations. But for the most part they're bad because regulators and constituents have bad ideas, not because there are shadowy cabals at work.

CryptoPunk 9y ago
>>Hardly. Code can be intensely political (competing standards championed by competing companies, etc.). The decision to make a particular segment of code the standard can be political, but the effective utilization of that code within a project once it has become the standard, has no political element to it. >>Regulatory agencies are for the most part incredibly transparent organizations. That is not the impression I get from the many complaints I've seen from those trying to navigate the regulatory framework. Of course I haven't done a comprehensive/rigorous study of this topic so my impression may not be an accurate representation of reality. I also find it hard to believe that a legalistic (as opposed to programmatic) domain like regulatory enforcement does not have a significant human element that cannot be fully articulated in formal notices and procedures. >>And your speculation is based on? On the fact that there is a very large rent-seeking opportunity in enacting regulatory barriers to entry, as demonstrated by the impact regulations have on income inequality (which is a consequence of economic rent accruing to those at the top of the industry ladder).