4 ms·
What do you mean? It still sends a portion of the hash, not the whole password, but that's still some information, no? An attacker brute-forcing hashes doesn't
by StavrosK 9y ago
What do you mean? It still sends a portion of the hash, not the whole password, but that's still some information, no? An attacker brute-forcing hashes doesn't care if he finds the exact hash or a set of a thousand he can try. In fact, since the database is public, if I have your range and the password is in it, I only have to try a few hundred passwords at most to find which one yours is. Granted, I also need to know which service you're using this on, but that doesn't seem that hard to find out.
- jgrahamc 9y agoI think the scenario you are describing is the following: the attacker somehow gets the hash submitted to the API and then runs JtR or similar to crack the password. That doesn't work because only the first five characters of the hash are sent to the API. The API then returns a list of all the hashes that have that prefix that it knows about. The client then (privately) is able to see if their password hash is in that list.
- StavrosK 9y agoNo, it's more like "attacker gets the range, sends it to the API, gets all the possible hashes from the API, tries the corresponding plaintext passwords, thus needs only ~200 tries instead of X million". Granted, your password was compromised already if it was in that list, so it needs to be changed anyway, but there's some information revealed by the hash (of course, how else could it be checked?).
- jgrahamc 9y agoGot it. That makes sense.
- dingo_bat 9y agoBut the whole point of the api is that you don't use the password if it is found in the list. So the attacker will know about the 200 strings that are definitely not the password.
- StavrosK 9y agoAssuming you managed to instantly change the password on every single service you've used it, yes.
- euroclydon 9y agoNobody is talking about it, but to compromise someone, you also need the username, which is not sent.
- StavrosK 9y agoAh, that's true. In any case, I don't think this is really a reasonable vector of attack, I was just being pedantic at jgc's "the password is not sent" comment.