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To Apple's credit there are still significant parts of their platform that remain end-to-end encrypted even in China -- meaning that Apple or any other cloud op

To Apple's credit there are still significant parts of their platform that remain end-to-end encrypted even in China -- meaning that Apple or any other cloud operator can't read because they don't have the keys, notably:[1] - iMessage - Keychain - Siri data And more like health, home & payments. While it's unfortunate that Apple couldn't compel China to run their government requests for data through the U.S. court system, in my view it is pretty amazing that they are "getting away" with keeping the most sensitive data end-to-end encrypted. I mean China shut down WhatsApp last year and iMessage is of a similar level of security.[2] Then again nobody really uses iMessage in China. They do use keychain. [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 [2] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

mtgx 9y ago
To Apple's non-credit, it's still tying iMessage backups to iCloud backups despite years of criticism over this. That means everyone who uses iCloud backups (enabled by default on iPhones) don't actually benefit from iMessage's "end-to-end encryption" (which isn't that safe against sophisticated hackers or oppressive authorities to begin with). I'd say people may as well forget about Apple's "privacy stance". It's nothing but smokescreen at this point (yes, even in the U.S.).
- abalone 9y ago
  > iMessage's "end-to-end encryption" (which isn't that safe against sophisticated hackers or oppressive authorities to begin with) Could you support this claim please? Re: iCloud backups you're correct. So far. They're about to release iMessages-in-iCloud though, which might obviate the need to include them in iCloud backups.
  - vengefulduck 9y ago
    iMessage uses short RSA 1280-bit keys which could be cracked by a well funded attacker. [1]https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
    - snuxoll 9y ago
      1280-bit keys are still mostly sufficient for now, this isn’t a website where every party is relying on the key of the server being heavily resistant to protects millions of users - every device has a unique key. Still, you are correct that a determined adversary, potentially one capable of purchasing a quantum computer with enough quibits could factor the device key. It would be nice to see Apple move to a large enough ECC key which would improve security against quantum computing attacks in particular.
      - fossuser 9y ago
        I don’t think there any quantum computers yet? The last I heard there was one example of factoring 15 and I think it assumed the factors? Did something change?
        snuxoll 9y ago
        True ones are still off in the near future, ones with enough quibits for Shor’s algorithm are far enough away for now as well - which is why I generally feel safe with the current level of cryptography Apple uses with iMessage. I won’t underestimate the rate at which they are developed though, it takes 2x the key size as the number of quibits to run Shor’s algorithm - ~2600 is a lot smaller than 4096, and even then who knows how much time we have until that happens.
- madeofpalk 9y ago
  My understanding is that Apple recently enabled end to end encryption for iOS backups using your password?
  - abalone 9y ago
    Just keychain backups. However they could extend that mechanism to other data. I’m excited to see what they do with iMessage-on-iCloud which is very close to release.
- ztjio 9y ago
  So don't use iCloud backups. You're never required to. You can trivially back up through iTunes, even automatically via Wi-Fi assuming you have them on the same network regularly. Anyone concerned about privacy, the first thing they should be ensuring is they are NOT using iCloud backup.
  - jzoch 9y ago
    You're correct, though its Apple's MO to supply security in an intuitive manner. IF you tout all these parts of your platform as secure and have one insecure piece that interfaces with it then it isnt a secure platform. The onus should be on Apple to secure iCloud. To their credit, I think they know that and will be. Those who are knowledgeable and care about security will continue to stay ahead of those who aren't, but Apple is making the division smaller.
  - ballenf 9y ago
    Given that Apple recently removed the ability to buy apps from iTunes, I think the writings's on the wall for the ability to locally backup iOS devices. Which is a huge shame. My guess is they're waiting for more complete coverage in terms of iCloud functionality and maybe security. But Apple has been known to pull the plug on "pro" functionality like this and/or remove functionality before the replacement was quite ready yet.
    - r00fus 9y ago
      What was the use case for buying apps on iTunes as opposed to any one of your iOS devices?
      - tluyben2 9y ago
        Legacy maybe? You could only buy from iTunes in the beginning.
    - thisacctforreal 9y ago
      For many years it has been possible to backup iOS devices using the native protocols, thanks to libimobiledevice. http://www.libimobiledevice.org http://www.libimobiledevice.org On macOS (I also use it on Linux, haven't tried on Windows): brew install libimobiledevice ## to disable iCloud backups idevicebackup2 cloud off ## if you want encrypted backups (native encryption) idevicebackup2 encryption on -i ## backup to a folder idevicebackup2 backup backup-folder ## restore from a backup idevicebackup2 restore backup-folder This uses the same format as iTunes, which stores them in ~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup There are more utilities included: idevice_id idevicedebugserverproxy idevicenotificationproxy idevicebackup idevicediagnostics idevicepair idevicebackup2 ideviceenterrecovery ideviceprovision idevicecrashreport ideviceimagemounter idevicescreenshot idevicedate ideviceinfo idevicesyslog idevicedebug idevicename iproxy You can also mount your iPhone's filesystem using ifuse (the only one in a separate package): brew cask install osxfuse brew install ifuse ## mount your iPhone ifuse mount-point ## unmount, or eject using Finder umount mount-point Parts of these protocols have been around since the first iPhones, I find it highly unlikely Apple will remove these anytime soon.
HenryBemis 9y ago
I don't think that Chinese government cares for the Siri Data as much. Not many Chinese people ask "Hey Siri what is Democracy?". Keys to the cloud is the keys to the kingdom, unless someone turns off iCloud the moment they activate their phones.
dogma1138 9y ago
Aren’t all the passwords backedup in iCloud as well as all your phone backups? It seems that China would just need to do a bit of work but they still can get every piece of data on the device.
- abalone 9y ago
  Passwords are backed up but they are end to end encrypted. Check out Cloud Key Vault, it’s a pretty cool solution for keychain (password) backups designed for adversarial clouds. Unfortunately does not apply to regular iCloud backups or most other data. But a major step forward. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&feature=youtu.be&t=25m43s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&feature=youtu.be...
  - dogma1138 9y ago
    end to end encrypted doesn’t mean much when your decryption key is the Apple account/iCloud password. AFAIK I never had to define an encryption password for an iCloud backup only for local backups with iTunes which means that the device only needs my Apple account credentials to retrieve and decrypt a backup from iCloud as such China and for that matter any entity which gains lawful or unlawful access to your Apple account gets to have the keys to the kingdom.
    - abalone 9y ago
      You didn’t watch the video did you. That’s not how it works. The key is your device passcode.
      - dogma1138 9y ago
        The key for the backups can’t be the device passcode because the device passcode protects the key stored in the Secure Enclave on the device that is the local encryption key also 6 digits isn’t nearly enough entropy for any key derivation algorithm. I can download a backup from iCloud and unpack it in any device or use a 3rd party application to view to content of the backup and the only thing I need is the Apple account password used for iCloud.
jlgaddis 9y ago
An article by Matt Green that discussed (questioned?) some of this was on the front page earlier: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16449326 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16449326
tinus_hn 9y ago
Siri runs server side, I can’t see how that could work without the keys to its data

mtgx 9y ago

To Apple's non-credit, it's still tying iMessage backups to iCloud backups despite years of criticism over this. That means everyone who uses iCloud backups (enabled by default on iPhones) don't actually benefit from iMessage's "end-to-end encryption" (which isn't that safe against sophisticated hackers or oppressive authorities to begin with). I'd say people may as well forget about Apple's "privacy stance". It's nothing but smokescreen at this point (yes, even in the U.S.).

abalone 9y ago
> iMessage's "end-to-end encryption" (which isn't that safe against sophisticated hackers or oppressive authorities to begin with) Could you support this claim please? Re: iCloud backups you're correct. So far. They're about to release iMessages-in-iCloud though, which might obviate the need to include them in iCloud backups.
- vengefulduck 9y ago
  iMessage uses short RSA 1280-bit keys which could be cracked by a well funded attacker. [1]https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
  - snuxoll 9y ago
    1280-bit keys are still mostly sufficient for now, this isn’t a website where every party is relying on the key of the server being heavily resistant to protects millions of users - every device has a unique key. Still, you are correct that a determined adversary, potentially one capable of purchasing a quantum computer with enough quibits could factor the device key. It would be nice to see Apple move to a large enough ECC key which would improve security against quantum computing attacks in particular.
    - fossuser 9y ago
      I don’t think there any quantum computers yet? The last I heard there was one example of factoring 15 and I think it assumed the factors? Did something change?
      - snuxoll 9y ago
        True ones are still off in the near future, ones with enough quibits for Shor’s algorithm are far enough away for now as well - which is why I generally feel safe with the current level of cryptography Apple uses with iMessage. I won’t underestimate the rate at which they are developed though, it takes 2x the key size as the number of quibits to run Shor’s algorithm - ~2600 is a lot smaller than 4096, and even then who knows how much time we have until that happens.
madeofpalk 9y ago
My understanding is that Apple recently enabled end to end encryption for iOS backups using your password?
- abalone 9y ago
  Just keychain backups. However they could extend that mechanism to other data. I’m excited to see what they do with iMessage-on-iCloud which is very close to release.
ztjio 9y ago
So don't use iCloud backups. You're never required to. You can trivially back up through iTunes, even automatically via Wi-Fi assuming you have them on the same network regularly. Anyone concerned about privacy, the first thing they should be ensuring is they are NOT using iCloud backup.
- jzoch 9y ago
  You're correct, though its Apple's MO to supply security in an intuitive manner. IF you tout all these parts of your platform as secure and have one insecure piece that interfaces with it then it isnt a secure platform. The onus should be on Apple to secure iCloud. To their credit, I think they know that and will be. Those who are knowledgeable and care about security will continue to stay ahead of those who aren't, but Apple is making the division smaller.
- ballenf 9y ago
  Given that Apple recently removed the ability to buy apps from iTunes, I think the writings's on the wall for the ability to locally backup iOS devices. Which is a huge shame. My guess is they're waiting for more complete coverage in terms of iCloud functionality and maybe security. But Apple has been known to pull the plug on "pro" functionality like this and/or remove functionality before the replacement was quite ready yet.
  - r00fus 9y ago
    What was the use case for buying apps on iTunes as opposed to any one of your iOS devices?
    - tluyben2 9y ago
      Legacy maybe? You could only buy from iTunes in the beginning.
  - thisacctforreal 9y ago
    For many years it has been possible to backup iOS devices using the native protocols, thanks to libimobiledevice. http://www.libimobiledevice.org http://www.libimobiledevice.org On macOS (I also use it on Linux, haven't tried on Windows): brew install libimobiledevice ## to disable iCloud backups idevicebackup2 cloud off ## if you want encrypted backups (native encryption) idevicebackup2 encryption on -i ## backup to a folder idevicebackup2 backup backup-folder ## restore from a backup idevicebackup2 restore backup-folder This uses the same format as iTunes, which stores them in ~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup There are more utilities included: idevice_id idevicedebugserverproxy idevicenotificationproxy idevicebackup idevicediagnostics idevicepair idevicebackup2 ideviceenterrecovery ideviceprovision idevicecrashreport ideviceimagemounter idevicescreenshot idevicedate ideviceinfo idevicesyslog idevicedebug idevicename iproxy You can also mount your iPhone's filesystem using ifuse (the only one in a separate package): brew cask install osxfuse brew install ifuse ## mount your iPhone ifuse mount-point ## unmount, or eject using Finder umount mount-point Parts of these protocols have been around since the first iPhones, I find it highly unlikely Apple will remove these anytime soon.

HenryBemis 9y ago

I don't think that Chinese government cares for the Siri Data as much. Not many Chinese people ask "Hey Siri what is Democracy?". Keys to the cloud is the keys to the kingdom, unless someone turns off iCloud the moment they activate their phones.

dogma1138 9y ago

Aren’t all the passwords backedup in iCloud as well as all your phone backups? It seems that China would just need to do a bit of work but they still can get every piece of data on the device.

abalone 9y ago
Passwords are backed up but they are end to end encrypted. Check out Cloud Key Vault, it’s a pretty cool solution for keychain (password) backups designed for adversarial clouds. Unfortunately does not apply to regular iCloud backups or most other data. But a major step forward. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&feature=youtu.be&t=25m43s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&feature=youtu.be...
- dogma1138 9y ago
  end to end encrypted doesn’t mean much when your decryption key is the Apple account/iCloud password. AFAIK I never had to define an encryption password for an iCloud backup only for local backups with iTunes which means that the device only needs my Apple account credentials to retrieve and decrypt a backup from iCloud as such China and for that matter any entity which gains lawful or unlawful access to your Apple account gets to have the keys to the kingdom.
  - abalone 9y ago
    You didn’t watch the video did you. That’s not how it works. The key is your device passcode.
    - dogma1138 9y ago
      The key for the backups can’t be the device passcode because the device passcode protects the key stored in the Secure Enclave on the device that is the local encryption key also 6 digits isn’t nearly enough entropy for any key derivation algorithm. I can download a backup from iCloud and unpack it in any device or use a 3rd party application to view to content of the backup and the only thing I need is the Apple account password used for iCloud.

jlgaddis 9y ago

An article by Matt Green that discussed (questioned?) some of this was on the front page earlier: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16449326 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16449326

tinus_hn 9y ago

Siri runs server side, I can’t see how that could work without the keys to its data