3 ms·
The example given is a bit fuzzy about what it is showing and what assumptions are being made. This example is pretty bizarre because we have actors behaving ec
by roenxi 9y ago
The example given is a bit fuzzy about what it is showing and what assumptions are being made. This example is pretty bizarre because we have actors behaving economically irrationally (the $100 provider) and beneficiaries (I'll call them listees) who don't seem to have volunteered. I think it might be meant to simulate the creation of new money, but I don't accept the situation as being similar enough to be sensible (because no money is being created).
Mr-give-away-$100 is burning resources (his cash reserves) to create an asset for 10 people (the potential to be given money randomly in the future, which is a strange financial asset). That asset is absolutely saleable on a secondary market and will be priced at some value south of $100.
We can deduce who is on the list by observing who gets the $100 payments and deduce the probability after a few days of observation. The listees have incentive to provide this information as asset + secondary market is better for them than asset + no secondary market.
Upper bound: Nobody is going to pay >$100 for a promise of $100 (I lie, that does happen, but only in rare and extreme circumstances. We'll ignore those).
Lower bound: If the listed individual needs money NOW for some reason, which does happen in practice, then they may be willing to sell at any price >$0.
Mechanism: A contract. They work well for events that happen in the future.
Motive: The listees are giving up a small amount of value to smooth out their income stream.
Results: When the $100 is transferred out of
Mr-give-away-$100's account it will immediately be transferred to someone who bought it for some value $100 > X > $0; at a guess probably in the high $90 range.
The person who was gifted a free asset will get rich, but that can be realised before the actual payment is made.
- dlubarov 9y agoSuch contracts would not really add any net costs to the system, since they cost virtually no resources. Whereas if I send $100 to the winner of a PoW contest, then $99 worth of electricity will be expended. Even if the contracts did add some costs to the system, PoW systems can have similar contracts. I could join a PoW pool and agree to share any $100 rewards I receive with the pool. Alternatively, we could just avoid the matter of contracts by replacing $100 with $1. $1 is small enough that nobody would need to think about diminishing returns, so there would be little point in spreading out the risk.