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So then how can we be sure the ballot boxes weren't switched or stuffed inbetween the polling station and the count site?
by wu-ikkyu 9y ago
So then how can we be sure the ballot boxes weren't switched or stuffed inbetween the polling station and the count site?
- pjc50 9y agoSecurity seals. https://www.mfsecurityseals.uk/securing-general-election/ https://www.mfsecurityseals.uk/securing-general-election/ The ballot papers themselves are traceable, so if you're going to stuff the box you need to add the relevant number of ballots to the record and fake their issue to particular voters. They're also in the custody of ballot officials; in the UK this is one area where I genuinely trust the ability of those people making up the system to operate genuinely according to the rules. We've even managed to hold fair elections in occupied Belfast. Switching to e-voting would turn the whole thing over to known insecure consumer PCs and known suspect contractors like Diebold and Capita, all of whom I trust about as far as I can throw them; I trust the small army of ordinary people who make the paper count happen far more. Maybe next election I'll volunteer as an observer.
- braderhart 9y agoOr you could help work on an open source technical solution so that this ridiculous corruptible process is fixed.
- pjc50 9y agoThe paper solution is not ridiculous, it's perfectly workable. The electronic solution is the one where malicious actors can substitute key parts of the process and things may be vulnerable to attacks that nobody has thought of (Meltdown/Spectre passim).
- Feniks 9y agoYou would presumably have to compromise a lot of ballot boxes in order to influence an election. This would require a coordinated conspiracy potentially involving thousands of people. If you can pull that off you might as well say fuck it and take over the country with force.