Right, so there’s the problem. I consider post-quantum cryotography to be more important than everything else on that list aside from transaction frequency. It

Right, so there’s the problem. I consider post-quantum cryotography to be more important than everything else on that list aside from transaction frequency. It should be, at the least, a serious consideration for any new cryptocurrency, even if they don’t ultimately move forward with it after a cost-benefit analysis. The threat model is more nuanced than “decades away.” The attacks may be decades away, but their targets will not necessarily be. Assets and communications secured today will be fully seizable and transparent in the future, you just don’t know exactly when. In other words, old ciphertexts have to be disposed of or re-encrypted, and addresses need to upgrade to pq-secure signature schemes. This all takes for granted the idea that quantum computers will ever feasibly break classical cryptosystems (I’m weakly pessimistic it will happen in the next 100 years). But if you do accept that premise, you either implement post-quantum cryptography now if you can afford it, or you implement it on top of legacy software in the indeterminate future. The latter option is a legitimate decision, to be clear. But I can also virtually guarantee that some cryptocurrencies will footgun themselves in the process of upgrading when they’re more established. I agree with you that IOTA is taking on a lot, but I really don’t think Winternitz signatures are exactly the deciding factor in that, based on how packed that list is already :)