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Can you mention one or two alternatives? Summing something like log-happiness doesn't help (and really isn't much more than objecting for the sake of objecting.
by repsilat 9y ago
Can you mention one or two alternatives? Summing something like log-happiness doesn't help (and really isn't much more than objecting for the sake of objecting.) Thresholds for dignity just raise the zero-bar, and inequality metrics argue _for_ the repugnant conclusion.
Maybe mean/median/minimum happiness? They don't intuitively appeal to me, but I'd like to hear an argument for them from someone who believes in them (as well as arguments for systems I haven't considered.)
Of course there are plenty of non-utilitarian systems to choose from, but I'm sure few their proponents would like to describe as maximising happiness :-)
- TuringTest 9y agoMaximizing the minimum value is a sound optimization method. It gets an overall sound system that doesn't get any obvious break point. In terms of happiness, it makes sure that no one is left behind, and tends to produce a more homogeneous society than optimizing for the average. Also, [1]. [1] https://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2569 https://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2569
- repsilat 9y ago> doesn't get any obvious break point Well, aside from the imperative to euthanise the least happy regardless of their absolute happiness, I guess :-). And making most individual actions normally called moral or immoral difficult to justify or condemn except that they might indirectly affect the least happy person. And then there's the weird idea that my local actions may have moral weight depending on the arbitrary existence of an unhappy person in a distant country. All seems pretty bizarre to me.
- greenpresident 9y agoYou are retracing the arguments made by Rawls in Theory of Justice. The result he proposes is a maximin principle that gives (grossly simplified) based on the maximum of access to social goods that is compatible with similar access for everyone else (equality principle). Differences are to be favored if they advance the situation of the least well off and if they are based on contribution/merit (differences principle). Most commonly, maximin is extended to leximin i. e. Looking at the next least welloff. There are traditions of critique both from communitarianism (Sandel et al.) and libertarianism (Nozick et al.), both worth looking into.