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The thing is that "control of the DNS" can mean different things. I have control of the DNS on my network, and at the local coffee shop. I can use that to atta

The thing is that "control of the DNS" can mean different things. I have control of the DNS on my network, and at the local coffee shop. I can use that to attack users, but I cannot use that to obtain a certificate. I still agree with you in a sense, an alternate solution would be great. But we that middleman is the best we have right now.

josteink 9y ago
> The thing is that "control of the DNS" can mean different things. In every way this discussion is related, "control of the DNS" should mean control of the one authoritative DNS source, in a way which means that if a service across the internet requests a DNS record, it won't be affected by whatever DNS-trick your neighbourhood cafe's wifi may apply. Trying to muddle the discussion of a fairly straight-forward, reliable scenario with consumer-space DNS resolution is IMO not very productive.
- icebraining 9y ago
  But that's the point - the CA is needed to make a reliable verification of the data coming from the authoritative DNS source, since the consumer can't make that check themselves in an untrusted network.
- technion 9y ago
  The discussion directly relates to a user typing google.com and knowing, via https, that they are talking to Google. The CA preventing the local DNS trick is entirely relevant.
ams6110 9y ago
So if I fix my DNS to 8.8.8.8 (or other well-known public DNS) does that not largely squash the coffee-shop attack vector?
- technion 9y ago
  I could spoof the gateway and forward 8.8.8.8 to my own machine with my own rules.
MertsA 9y ago
I mean strictly in the sense that we already have root servers pointing to TLDs pointing to individual domains all the way down. I'm not suggesting DANE in particular here I'm suggesting trust one "Super CA" that signs a "sub CA" for a TLD that signs another sub CA for the domain which can keep doing the same thing. Basically just chain each CA together but all of the sub CAs would be further and further constrained such that .ly couldn't sign certs for .com and ycombinator.com could only sign certs for subdomains of ycombinator.com. In essence, we already trust the registrars to link a name to an entity, DV certs are just going to defer the judgement to the registrar so why bother trusting an additional entity to issue certs for every domain instead of just having the registrar sign your CA that can only issue for your domain and only until your domain expires. Right now AFAIK I can technically get a SSL cert for a domain I control and have it expire well past when the domain expired and was transferred to another party. I now have a valid certificate for a domain that I don't own.

josteink 9y ago

> The thing is that "control of the DNS" can mean different things. In every way this discussion is related, "control of the DNS" should mean control of the one authoritative DNS source, in a way which means that if a service across the internet requests a DNS record, it won't be affected by whatever DNS-trick your neighbourhood cafe's wifi may apply. Trying to muddle the discussion of a fairly straight-forward, reliable scenario with consumer-space DNS resolution is IMO not very productive.

icebraining 9y ago
But that's the point - the CA is needed to make a reliable verification of the data coming from the authoritative DNS source, since the consumer can't make that check themselves in an untrusted network.
technion 9y ago
The discussion directly relates to a user typing google.com and knowing, via https, that they are talking to Google. The CA preventing the local DNS trick is entirely relevant.

ams6110 9y ago

So if I fix my DNS to 8.8.8.8 (or other well-known public DNS) does that not largely squash the coffee-shop attack vector?

technion 9y ago
I could spoof the gateway and forward 8.8.8.8 to my own machine with my own rules.

MertsA 9y ago

I mean strictly in the sense that we already have root servers pointing to TLDs pointing to individual domains all the way down. I'm not suggesting DANE in particular here I'm suggesting trust one "Super CA" that signs a "sub CA" for a TLD that signs another sub CA for the domain which can keep doing the same thing. Basically just chain each CA together but all of the sub CAs would be further and further constrained such that .ly couldn't sign certs for .com and ycombinator.com could only sign certs for subdomains of ycombinator.com. In essence, we already trust the registrars to link a name to an entity, DV certs are just going to defer the judgement to the registrar so why bother trusting an additional entity to issue certs for every domain instead of just having the registrar sign your CA that can only issue for your domain and only until your domain expires. Right now AFAIK I can technically get a SSL cert for a domain I control and have it expire well past when the domain expired and was transferred to another party. I now have a valid certificate for a domain that I don't own.