> I am not sure I understand the distinction you make between your 1 and 2 The difference is that collusion between banks is cartel price fixing and is very il

> I am not sure I understand the distinction you make between your 1 and 2 The difference is that collusion between banks is cartel price fixing and is very illegal. The majority of reported cases of traders requesting rate moves did not fall into this category unlike the Hayes case. For the cases where the traders were just asking their own setters to move the rate, there was no collusion. They work for the same company and not even in separate, Chinese walled departments. Also, in the intra-bank cases, I don't recall seeing any where the setters were actually breaking BBA rules. The problem was that the rules were meaningless when there was no uncollateralised borrowing. > I am not sure the impact on the market was nefarious You're making a lot of assumptions. What is clear is that the interventions were material and directional. And that would have had an effect on both institutional and retail customers. That's usually the time when regulators get all medieval.