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The article is light on the description of what actually happened but there is a section about the impact of his action and whether he relised the impact. One
by cm2187 9y ago
The article is light on the description of what actually happened but there is a section about the impact of his action and whether he relised the impact.
One thing to understand is that there was not one but two distinct manipulations of Libor.
The first is the one this article refers to, which is before the financial crisis, swap traders influencing the libor submitters to move their contribution to the fixing by a tiny amount, often a couple of basis points, to fit the massive future positions they were sitting on. Completely unethical and illegal but unlikely to have any noticable effect on the market, kind of like stealing a penny from a million bank accounts. It’s still stealing, but the impact on the market is limited.
The second manipulation was of a different nature. It is at the height of the financial crisis, when banks were failing as a result of bank runs every week, libor submitters, probably under instruction / tacit consent from their management and regulators, low balled their contribution to the libor fixing to not appear to be struggling to fund themselves (by having a high cost of borrowing) since these contributions were public and investors were trying to infer what bank was next to fail. These low balling were probably in the 50-300 basis point range, ie with a material impact on the wider maket (borrowers should have paid significantly higher interest rates during that period). And this is the one whistle blowers complained to regulators about, falling into deaf ears.
- osullivj 9y agoThe article is wrong in a couple of substantial matters. Firstly: "as far as I can tell, he is the only banker currently in jail for crimes committed during the financial crisis." Wrong - the Barclays Swap traders are doing time. @teamJayMerchant is in HMP Wandsworth. Secondly: "the ultimate people who drive behavior at banks are actually the shareholders." I own some banking shares and I wish I didn't. Long experience of working in the banking sector has convinced me that banks are run for the benefit of the senior management. Shareholders, like customers, are just convenient chumps to be gouged at every turn.
- viraptor 9y ago> I own some banking shares and I wish I didn't. I'm really curious what you mean by that. Is it just that they bring good money, or why don't you get rid of them?
- osullivj 9y agoI was a permie at BARC 2004-10 and bought shares in 05, 06, 07 using the employee discount system when they were around 700. I got one free for each paid, and the ones I paid for came out of pretax income, so effectively I paid ~30% of face price. But even at that entry I'm still underwater.
- 8bitsrule 9y ago"... are run for the benefit of the senior management." Replace the ellipsis with almost any organization - theocracies on down. I maintain that this feature is the real purpose of all human organizations. With some dither for the smallest.
- lucozade 9y ago> two distinct manipulations of Libor I'd argue that there were three. The first, and unquestionably illegal, was what Tom Hayes did i.e. collusion between actors at multiple banks to move Libor. I don't think he should have got the sentence he did but prison was definitely justified. The second was swaps traders getting their own setters to go in high or low. I'm not at all sure this was illegal. Given that Libor was completely broken at the time, I'm not even sure I'd argue that it was unethical. As there was, essentially, no uncollateralised inter-bank borrowing, any figure was wrong. And, as you say, the effect was minor and not particularly directional. I think your second point, the systemic low balling of Libor by senior management, is, by far, the most important. It's also the one that has had the least public attention. What is particularly problematic about it is the influence that governments had. Because of the latter, I'm sure that it won't ever be properly investigated.
- Lazare 9y agoIndeed. It's widely accepted (although as far as I know, not quite proven), that the third manipulation was done with the full knowledge of (and, many would say, at the instigation of) the Bank of England. Whether it's "legal" or not is almost beside the point; it's not going to be punished. And it took place in a (hopefully) completely unique scenario, so hopefully there's little risk of moral hazard.
- cm2187 9y agoI am not sure I understand the distinction you make between your 1 and 2. The swap traders had no way to manipulate the libor fixings directly, they had to go through their libor submitters. You are right that they appear to have been colluding to do so between banks. On the low balling, interestingly I am not sure the impact on the market was nefarious. It was certainly material but I do not believe that when borrowers and lenders referenced Libor in their loan contract, they really meant to index their interest rate paid on the 3 month credit risk of a bank. I think they did on the assumption that large international banks had near zero credit risk for 3 months borrowing (which was true until 2007) and that Libor was a convenient way to measure a 3 month risk free rate on top of which they would add a credit risk margin. When Libor started shooting up in 2008, it was not because of the general levels of interest rates (central banks were slashing interest rates at the same time) but because of bank credit risk. So though contractually borrowers should have paid a higher interest rate during that period, the low balling probably had the effect to make the interest rate closer than what borrowers and lenders probably intended when they referenced Libor in their contract.
- EnFinlay 9y agoInteresting. Have you see "The Big Short"? Towards the end there's some scenes where banks aren't paying out on Credit Default Swaps (I think) even though the mortgages were failing. The movie didn't really touch on why this was happening. Was this caused by the second manipulation that you mentioned?
- cm2187 9y agoI don't think it is related. The CDS in question was buying credit protection (i.e. insurance against a default) on a portfolio of subprime RMBS bonds. When a default occurs in that portfolio, the protection seller (the bank) must make whole the buyer of the protection as if he held the underlying bond (which in this case he didn't, it's like buying insurance on your neighbor's house, you get paid if it burns but you didn't suffer the loss yourself since you didn't own the house). But before that, both parties must post collateral to each other on the fair value of the CDS contract, which will ultimately converge to the payoff of the credit protection. This is to ensure that no party is taking risk on the other party defaulting before the maturity of the CDS (exactly like margin calls when you are buying a stock on margin). Problem, the portfolio of subprime RMBS consists in a lot of small transactions, which don't necessarily have an active market, and that led to disputes between the protection seller and the protection buyer on what the CDS contract was really worth (you can't translate 1 for 1 a rise in delinquencies - % of subprime borrowers ceasing to make payments on their mortgages - and the ultimate loss suffered on the portfolio of mortgages after the property has been foreclosed and sold several months/years later). It mattered not just because the other party would have to post more collateral, but also because the other party would have to mark a loss if the agreed value was less than what it marked the position for in its books and records.
- EnFinlay 9y agoAh gotcha. Thank you for the explanation!