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Maybe you don't understand. In my iCloud Keychain is the credentials for EVERY website that I have basically ever signed it into. It has credentials for intern
by threeseed 9y ago
Maybe you don't understand.
In my iCloud Keychain is the credentials for EVERY website that I have basically ever signed it into. It has credentials for internet banking, work email and VPN, AWS and Google Cloud etc. Just for me it is over 250 websites. It even stores SSH keypairs.
If the Chinese government had the ability to access those for all Chinese iCloud users (and roaming tourists ?) that would a seriously big deal.
- walterbell 9y agoWould a local-only iOS password manager reduce this exposure?
- rarepostinlurkr 9y agoThat’s not how iCloud Keychain works. It’s a transfer method for data encrypted by keys only your circle has. You control who is added not Apple. Read the white paper
- sneak 9y agoIn theory you control who is added to an iMessage too, but Apple’s closed source software is what does the controlling. Enter a government wiretap, and boom.
- willstrafach 9y agoI am not sure why closed-source code would be relevant here. The opaque aspect in this case would be the server handling it, not the device.
- sneak 9y agoiMessage is end to end encrypted.
- tonyztan 9y agoYes, but the key server (operated by Apple) is free to add additional keys to your account that others will use to encrypt messages to you.
- sneak 9y agoYes. In the iCloud Keychain model, the key client (written by Apple, “operated” without review by you) is free to add additional keys to your account that you will use to encrypt messages to you.
- willstrafach 9y agoCorrect. I was addressing the "closed source software" aspect, because some level is trust is required in the server for key distribution regardless of source availability.