>How do we know other humans aren't "very sophisticated programs"? We don't. Most people assume that other people have consciousness, with various justificatio

>How do we know other humans aren't "very sophisticated programs"? We don't. Most people assume that other people have consciousness, with various justifications, but no one can know that. >a magic thing with no measurable properties that makes us oh-so-different than a crude material object. But it does make a difference morally speaking. If we consider a Utilitarian model of morality, then what is good or bad is that which causes the experiences of happiness or suffering. But if a philosophical zombie does not experience pleasure or suffering, then there is no moral consequence to harming them, any more than there is moral consequence to watching someone die in a movie, or to splitting a rock in half. And this becomes even more worrying when we start to think about AI. If an AI can develop consciousness as a result of our actions, then perhaps it can also experience suffering as a result of our actions. Of course, since we cannot identify p-zombies, possibly by definition, one can argue that there's not much point thinking about it. But, well, you could say that about a lot of philosophy. Personally, I think it's valuable to think about these things as an intellectual exercise, even if we can't really conclude anything from it.