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> what if there is no good formal theory to explain how it works? We don't need a theory that is perfect. Each theory was partially wrong but still lets you ma
by canes123456 9y ago
> what if there is no good formal theory to explain how it works?
We don't need a theory that is perfect. Each theory was partially wrong but still lets you make useful predictions about the world. We need useful models that let you reason about the world. All models are wrong, some are useful.
> What if intelligence, both animal and machine, is purely random trial and error and "this thing seems to work"?
Evolution could be just considered random trail and error. However until we reach the singularity, we need people to speed up the evolution process by adapting and remixing pieces that worked before. We need models for what each level does so have ideas of what to try for a new application.
- jfoutz 9y agoI think the gp is referring to something a little more general. Let's pretend for a moment that our minds can be modeled by a formal system. Every thought has a chain of axioms grounding it. So, the scary part is, Godel showed us there are true things that can't be represented by a formal system. Maybe the useful models exist, but we can't comprehend them, because they're true outside of the set of rules we happened to get built into our minds? generally though, i'm on board with you. all models are wrong, some models are useful.
- eli_gottlieb 9y ago>Let's pretend for a moment that our minds can be modeled by a formal system. Since our minds are more like perception-action variational inference systems, that's a hell of a lot of pretending ;-).
- canes123456 9y agoI am saying there is no connection between the two. You don't need a single complete formal system for a useful model of what is occurring. Godel was saying there can't be one true complete set of axioms for mathematics. This does not mean all mathematical models, theories are suddenly impossible.
- rocqua 9y ago> Godel showed us there are true things that can't be represented by a formal system. This is stretching things a bit. Specifically, it defines truth as 'does not lead to a contradiction in (some formal system that extends) Peano arithmetic'. Then, as there are statements that are 'true' in this sense in such a system A but not probable by that system, there are 'unproveable truths'. But is that satisfactory as a definition of truth? It used to be because we had hope for a complete and consistent formal system, which feel very truthy. When Godel proved that cannot exist, perhaps the conclusion is that formal systems aren't the 'base' for truth.