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> What's missing is a LetsEncrypt-style effort to make it easy for people in non-managed environments to get and renew certificates. This is a far harder probl
by jcranmer 9y ago
> What's missing is a LetsEncrypt-style effort to make it easy for people in non-managed environments to get and renew certificates.
This is a far harder problem than it looks. Let's Encrypt basically relies on a demonstration of control of a web server, and the resulting certificate is only as strong as that validation. For email, the way you can demonstrate control is in being able to read and send emails originating from an address... but the point of S/MIME is to secure against other people who can also do that.
That's sort of the conundrum with email encryption. Your connections to and from the email server are encrypted (assuming you're not using an idiotic client, but if you care about encryption, this assumption is valid). Most traffic (~80%) between the major service providers at large is already encrypted. So the only people who can access your email in the first place are the people who can access your email account, namely you, anyone you give access to, and administrators on your email server. Any practical way of rolling out universal encryption is going to have to involve the latter party anyways, so there's little point to going for automatic universal encryption at the S/MIME-level: making the MX/MX links be SSL and banning non-SSL connections at the MUA level are much more effectual.
- acdha 9y ago> This is a far harder problem than it looks. Let's Encrypt basically relies on a demonstration of control of a web server, and the resulting certificate is only as strong as that validation. For email, the way you can demonstrate control is in being able to read and send emails originating from an address... but the point of S/MIME is to secure against other people who can also do that. The situation's a bit more nuanced than that: S/MIME protects you in the case where traffic can be read but not altered (or it would incur far more risk to do so) and most users state changes over time so there's more of a window to attack every message than to attack the account ownership validation, especially if that protocol is hardened. I see this as similar to the way many people are working to encourage end-to-end encryption because it reduces the amount of interesting data sitting around to be compromised on a server. Yes, at some point a hostile admin can do a lot but that doesn't mean that we can't harden against more realistic attacks.
- zokier 9y ago> For email, the way you can demonstrate control is in being able to read and send emails originating from an address... but the point of S/MIME is to secure against other people who can also do that. It's not exactly obvious how this situation is significantly different from the web side of things. > So the only people who can access your email in the first place are the people who can access your email account, namely you, anyone you give access to, and administrators on your email server What I think you are going after here is that shared/managed hosting style setups have only limited security, but that is equally true for web as it is for email.
- jcranmer 9y ago> It's not exactly obvious how this situation is significantly different from the web side of things. SSL protects against people who can casually monitor or intercept network connections. The attacker threat model is generally "coffee-shop wifi." In order to demonstrate control for Let's Encrypt, you need to ensure that some URL on your server delivers a specified byte content (the content given over a different channel). In essence, this kind of certificate says "I'm satisfied that the person who requested this certificate can arbitrarily modify the content on the website."