5 ms·
> there is no support for non-reliable streams I think the point of QUIC is to provide a reliable protocol. I'm not sure if this complaint is relevant. > I am
by baby 9y ago
> there is no support for non-reliable streams
I think the point of QUIC is to provide a reliable protocol. I'm not sure if this complaint is relevant.
> I am not keen on the variability and non-alignment of the whole header (which can go from 0 to 60+ bytes).
Agree
> it points too much towards just reducing the RTT for the initial connection (0RTT is a bad idea, especially if your application now needs to handle the special case of the connection being 0RTT or not).
It's annoying because you need to try decrypting with two different keys, but it simplifies the handshake for both side as the state machine is now super simple
> Perfect forward secrecy is not granted on the initial handshake (you need to explicitly do a second key exchange for that)
if you're talking about 0-RTT, I think replayability is a much bigger problem than forward secrecy as forward secrecy is bound to the server config rotation, so you just need to rotate frequently.
> The proof of ownership of the connection is one incredible hack
How is it a hack? It allows the server to be stateless and it works quite well. How would you make it better?
- Luker88 9y ago> I think the point of QUIC is to provide a reliable protocol. I'm not sure if this complaint is relevant. I found it easy to include support for unreliable streams in my protocol, I'm just not sure why they did not even try. I heard about a hack-proposal where you could just use a new stream for one packet and then forget about it, but it's not really the same, and I am not sure they did even that. > It's annoying because you need to try decrypting with two different keys, but it simplifies the handshake for both side as the state machine is now super simple The issue I have with it is that now it's the application that needs to be sure not to write too much without an additional round-trip, otherwise you could end up with an amplification attack. I remember reading that there was an additional call to be made by the application just for that. But other simplifications in the handshake are actually great, yes. > if you're talking about 0-RTT, I think replayability is a much bigger problem than forward secrecy as forward secrecy is bound to the server config rotation, so you just need to rotate frequently. Yes, see above. But if I remember correctly rotating keys also makes client unable to use the 0-RTT, so you can't do it too often. QUIC has a weaker PFS than TLS. Still secure, just weaker, and basically disabled unless you explicitely call a key rotation. I am just afraid that the implementations and servers out there will not use that. > How is it a hack? It allows the server to be stateless and it works quite well. How would you make it better? Are we talking about the same thing? I meant the entropy bit. Really dislike it. (Then again, it works, eh...). Yep, my bad, I said "ownership of connection" instead of "ownership od the IP". The ownership of the connection is derived only from the connection id and crypto keys, that's a nice simplification, yes.
- baby 9y ago> I found it easy to include support for unreliable streams in my protocol, I'm just not sure why they did not even try. I heard about a hack-proposal where you could just use a new stream for one packet and then forget about it, but it's not really the same, and I am not sure they did even that. Thinking about it, what would you want for an unreliable stream beside encryption? Isn't DTLS taking care of what you want? > The issue I have with it is that now it's the application that needs to be sure not to write too much without an additional round-trip, otherwise you could end up with an amplification attack. I remember reading that there was an additional call to be made by the application just for that. But other simplifications in the handshake are actually great, yes. So, the server is not going to reply unless the client has proven that it owns the source IP address. This should prevent any amplification attack tied to 0-RTT. Or you mean the kind of amplification attack where the client is tricked into talking to the wrong server? This probably could happen in some scenarios, mmm... I'm thinking that the client wouldn't use 0-RTT without knowing exactly who he's talking to (the cached server configuration is probably tied to the ip:port the client had to connect to the first time around). > if I remember correctly rotating keys also makes client unable to use the 0-RTT, so you can't do it too often. I think 0-RTT targets people connecting to the same website multiple times per day. So I can see scenarios where you would rotate it every day? I'd be interested to know how Google configures its own servers. I just checked, news.google.com has a SSTL of 84:4e:02:00:00:00:00:00 seconds, I think this should be in little endian so it should be around 2 days. This is how much time is left. It's not really informative actually, the SCFG (server config) contains an EXPY field with a unix timestamp indicating 1518350400 (2018/11/02 @ 12:00pm). I realize now that this doesn't tell us much more since it doesn't tell me when the server config was signed :| > QUIC has a weaker PFS than TLS Are you comparing it to TLS 1.3? If you're doing a PSK-based handshake with no key exchange, they should provide the same security properties. > I meant the entropy bit Can you tell me what you're talking about? I don't know the spec by heart. The cookie that the server gives to the client is an encryption of source ip and an expiration date, it just looks opaque to the client but the server can decrypt it and check it.
- floatboth 9y ago> what would you want for an unreliable stream Video?