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It is worth reading about the impact of supply chain on the other front of the Napoleonic Wars, the Peninsular War in the Iberian Peninsula, especially Wellingt
by ucaetano 9y ago
It is worth reading about the impact of supply chain on the other front of the Napoleonic Wars, the Peninsular War in the Iberian Peninsula, especially Wellington's defense of Portugal and the Torres Vedras.
The French forces largely relied on foraging an pillaging for supplies when operating in the Iberian Peninsula, which initially gave them a strong advantage, being able to operate inland without support. But eventually it also became a problem.
As they went deeper into Spain and then into Portugal, the lack of well established and guarded supply routes meant that messengers and envoys had to cross enemy territory filled with partisans, resulting in the birth of the guerrilla.
When they invaded Portugal and headed for Lisbon, matters became far worse. Wellington had secretly fortified the peninsula leading to Lisbon with a massive set of three line of hill forts (the Lines of Torres Vedras), and used scorched earth tactics to wipe out any resources beyond the lines, while Lisbon was well supported by the British Navy (that had complete control of the waters after Trafalgar).
As the French forces approached, they were utterly surprised to find the heavy fortifications, and the barren land meant they had no resources to maintain themselves, as there was no supply chain.
Running out of food and unable to break into any of the fortifications, they were forced to withdraw completely after a month going back to Spain and losing 1/3 of its men in the process due to the harsh winter.
The Peninsular War by Esdaile is a great book about this front, and the Sharpe series by Cornwell complement that with a historical novel aspect, and astonishing attention to detail.
- smogcutter 9y agoThe Lines of Torres Vedras were an incredible engineering achievement, especially considering they were kept a complete secret from the French. We're talking about 30 miles of continuous fortifications. Among the problems the French had in the peninsula, it seems Napoleon underestimated the poverty of the countryside and the poor quality of the roads. An army could live off the land just fine on the banks of the Danube, not so much on the high plain of Castile. The marshals would get orders as if a line on the map was an actual road, then find themselves marching tens of thousands of men over a glorified goat track through barren and almost uninhabited hills. Add in the guerrieros and you've got a big problem. I suppose for us it's a reminder to not mistake the map for the territory.