3 ms·
For a website, that's hard to achieve. You can ship some JS to pre-hash the password, but an attacker that can read unencrypted passwords from the server can pr
by icebraining 9y ago
For a website, that's hard to achieve. You can ship some JS to pre-hash the password, but an attacker that can read unencrypted passwords from the server can probably also modify that JS code to send the original password to them.
If you have clients that run locally (and for which the updates are hopefully signed offline), I do think that approach is sensible.
- nine_k 9y agoNot storing passwords on the server removes some of the incentives to break into the server, and makes a quick and covert heist impossible.
- ryan-c 9y agoIf the server requires me to send it the md5 of my password (for example), it still has to store something to validate the password, which can then be cracked.
- nine_k 9y agoSure, the server should expect a bcrypt hash, and only store a bcrypt hash. OTOH maybe requiring client to compute the hash is sometimes too drastic. Sending the password to the server via a properly encrypted channel (https) may be fine, provided that the server never stores it, and just uses it to compute a hash for comparison. Then my original point does not hold.