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I think the point is that if there's no randomness, people's actions must be completely predictable, and if they're predictable it's impossible for people to do
by pmoriarty 9y ago
I think the point is that if there's no randomness, people's actions must be completely predictable, and if they're predictable it's impossible for people to do other than what's been predicted and so there's no free will.
On the other hand, having randomness opens up the possibility to act in ways that are not completely predictable and that's where the potential for freedom of the will comes in. But randomness alone isn't enough for free will, for the reason you allude to (that one might be "forced" to follow some sort of cosmic "dice roll", as unpredictable as it might be). It just seems to be one pre-requisite, in a certain way of viewing the problem.
- syrrim 9y agoBut the universe is turing complete, so the only way to predict what will happen is to run a perfect simulation of everything in the universe. This is clearly impossible within the universe, and so your actions remain unpredictable.
- mannykannot 9y agoThis line of thought applies equally well to every individual hydrogen atom in the universe as it does to a person, yet it does not follow that they also have free will. Where OP says 'predictable', I think he means 'determined' or 'pre-ordained'.
- dingo_bat 9y agoBut since you cannot differentiate between predictable and preordained, what is the difference?
- mannykannot 9y agoThat something is not predictable does not mean that it is not pre-ordained, even if one cannot tell the difference. Classical mechanics is a model that is fully deterministic yet ultimately unpredictable, and similarly, syyrim's model of the universe as Turing-complete seems to assume it is pre-ordained (a model that goldenkey challenges), and yet ultimately unpredictable. On re-reading the thread, I am not sure what point syyrim was making. The ultimate unpredictability of the universe doesn't seem to settle any issue with regard to free will. Free will is not a claim that we cannot predict what we will do; it is a claim that we can make a choice (within some constraints) about what we will do.
- goldenkey 9y agoNot even. If you take Heisenbergs uncertainty principle to be true, then we can never truly know the full state of any matter. So even if we knew the rules, we wouldn't have the seed. This is also known as the knowledge balance principle. See link below: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spekkens_toy_model https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spekkens_toy_model
- mannykannot 9y agoWhile I have seen explanations of how randomness might lead to the illusion of free will, I have not seen any line of reasoning that explains free will itself as being dependent on randomness (because I have not seen any explanation of free will, period.) My guess is that randomness is imagined to have a role in free will only because it is the alternative to strict determinism (which is, as you point out, completely antithetical to free will) rather than because it is clear that randomness does, in fact, enable free will. It certainly feels to me that I have free will, but the older I get, the less sure I am that I actually do. Consequently, I have no idea how I came to write this post.