Let me do away with the word "strawman"--perhaps I have misused the word here. My point is that noobermin suggests that there are only two "bundles of rights"

Let me do away with the word "strawman"--perhaps I have misused the word here. My point is that noobermin suggests that there are only two "bundles of rights" that we may give to organisms: those that we have traditionally given to humans and to non-human animals. Noobermin says that we must "draw a line" between organisms that we may exploit and organisms that we must regard as human-like. (That traditionally we have indeed used nothing more nuanced than a binary distinction is not important: we are talking about possible, not actual, ethical frameworks.) This is wrong in principle because you can choose to assign individual rights on an individual basis. E.g., in one system of animal rights, I might say that everything with at least as much capacity to feel pain as a crustacean must be put under anesthesia before any surgical operations are performed on it, but I might also say that any animal with the ability to use tools may not be raised and killed for food. What's important here is not the particulars of my hypothetical animal rights framework. It's just that different animals would have different rights: chimpanzees and pigs would both not be permitted to be operated on without anesthesia, but pigs (and not chimpanzees) would be allowed to be eaten. Thus if we accept that you can make graded decisions in how you assign animals rights, you are not put on the slippery slope that ultimately claims you are committing genocide every time you use soap.