3 ms·

Ah, then I think we agree. My general take on Pinker's work is that to the extent that he's accurate, he's largely describing the impact of state power plus th

Ah, then I think we agree. My general take on Pinker's work is that to the extent that he's accurate, he's largely describing the impact of state power plus the benefits of prosperity. When he asks why murder is now so rare, the answer is a combination of "because if you murder you go to jail reliably" and "if someone wrongs you you call on the state". When he asks why Canada and Spain don't start a war over fishing rights, the answer is not "civilization and reason" but "because it would cost a million times what the fish are worth". Increased trade means most peaceful relationships are mutually beneficial, increased GDP per capita means that a life lost to violence is increasingly expensive in monetary terms, and the increasing mechanical capacity for war means that any small conflict can be easily escalated to a prohibitively expensive one. All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". That worries me, and I think Pinker does us all a disservice by conflating a decreasing appetite for violence with decreasing use of violence. Leviathan is there in the book, but not so much in the public conception.

cgmg 9y ago
> All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". I think moral standards, at large, have certainly improved. The very concept of human rights, as understood today, was alien not so long ago. Same applies to concepts like presumption of innocence, equality before the law, equality of genders and ethinicities, freedom of the press, international laws regarding war/plunder/noncombatants, etc. Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here.
- Bartweiss 9y ago
  > Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here. That's a work I can support, definitely. I don't mean to sound too cynical; it's easy to get caught up in presentism and forget that basic ideas like "what if racism is bad?" and "should we maybe stop doing torture?" are relatively recent. My concern with Pinker is less that nothing has gotten better, and more that he seems overly rosy about the decline of violence (I worry we've largely displaced it and rendered it intermittent) and that he appears to frame moral progress as some kind of fundamental improvement in the moral nature of humans or society. I'm much more inclined to Singer's argument, that we're the same semi-moral creatures we've always been, but have done steadily better at acknowledging the moral weight of groups other than our own.

cgmg 9y ago

> All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". I think moral standards, at large, have certainly improved. The very concept of human rights, as understood today, was alien not so long ago. Same applies to concepts like presumption of innocence, equality before the law, equality of genders and ethinicities, freedom of the press, international laws regarding war/plunder/noncombatants, etc. Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here.

Bartweiss 9y ago
> Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here. That's a work I can support, definitely. I don't mean to sound too cynical; it's easy to get caught up in presentism and forget that basic ideas like "what if racism is bad?" and "should we maybe stop doing torture?" are relatively recent. My concern with Pinker is less that nothing has gotten better, and more that he seems overly rosy about the decline of violence (I worry we've largely displaced it and rendered it intermittent) and that he appears to frame moral progress as some kind of fundamental improvement in the moral nature of humans or society. I'm much more inclined to Singer's argument, that we're the same semi-moral creatures we've always been, but have done steadily better at acknowledging the moral weight of groups other than our own.