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Thanks for the response. My qualm is a bit more involved than just the centralization of force. It has to do with whether or not the causes of violence are dec

by ABCLAW 9y ago

Thanks for the response. My qualm is a bit more involved than just the centralization of force. It has to do with whether or not the causes of violence are decreasing, or whether or not we're observing a temporary reduction in the overt displays of violence while the causes are left to grow in the background. In chemical terms, have we created buffering conditions for violence equilibria? If so, what happens the moment we cross the threshold. That said, Pinker himself heavily downplays the 'Leviathan' effect in interviews, debates and responses to criticisms, and bothers very little to examine what it means, especially because if the Leviathan is the primary force in quashing violence, then the rest of his project - in demonstrating the progress of mankind - is actively hampered.

Bartweiss 9y ago
Ah, then I think we agree. My general take on Pinker's work is that to the extent that he's accurate, he's largely describing the impact of state power plus the benefits of prosperity. When he asks why murder is now so rare, the answer is a combination of "because if you murder you go to jail reliably" and "if someone wrongs you you call on the state". When he asks why Canada and Spain don't start a war over fishing rights, the answer is not "civilization and reason" but "because it would cost a million times what the fish are worth". Increased trade means most peaceful relationships are mutually beneficial, increased GDP per capita means that a life lost to violence is increasingly expensive in monetary terms, and the increasing mechanical capacity for war means that any small conflict can be easily escalated to a prohibitively expensive one. All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". That worries me, and I think Pinker does us all a disservice by conflating a decreasing appetite for violence with decreasing use of violence. Leviathan is there in the book, but not so much in the public conception.
- cgmg 9y ago
  > All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". I think moral standards, at large, have certainly improved. The very concept of human rights, as understood today, was alien not so long ago. Same applies to concepts like presumption of innocence, equality before the law, equality of genders and ethinicities, freedom of the press, international laws regarding war/plunder/noncombatants, etc. Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here.
  - Bartweiss 9y ago
    > Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here. That's a work I can support, definitely. I don't mean to sound too cynical; it's easy to get caught up in presentism and forget that basic ideas like "what if racism is bad?" and "should we maybe stop doing torture?" are relatively recent. My concern with Pinker is less that nothing has gotten better, and more that he seems overly rosy about the decline of violence (I worry we've largely displaced it and rendered it intermittent) and that he appears to frame moral progress as some kind of fundamental improvement in the moral nature of humans or society. I'm much more inclined to Singer's argument, that we're the same semi-moral creatures we've always been, but have done steadily better at acknowledging the moral weight of groups other than our own.

by ABCLAW 9y ago

Bartweiss 9y ago

Ah, then I think we agree. My general take on Pinker's work is that to the extent that he's accurate, he's largely describing the impact of state power plus the benefits of prosperity. When he asks why murder is now so rare, the answer is a combination of "because if you murder you go to jail reliably" and "if someone wrongs you you call on the state". When he asks why Canada and Spain don't start a war over fishing rights, the answer is not "civilization and reason" but "because it would cost a million times what the fish are worth". Increased trade means most peaceful relationships are mutually beneficial, increased GDP per capita means that a life lost to violence is increasingly expensive in monetary terms, and the increasing mechanical capacity for war means that any small conflict can be easily escalated to a prohibitively expensive one. All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". That worries me, and I think Pinker does us all a disservice by conflating a decreasing appetite for violence with decreasing use of violence. Leviathan is there in the book, but not so much in the public conception.

cgmg 9y ago
> All of which is to say that I think we've solved some violence with sheer wealth, some with fear of the state, and perhaps very little with our "better angels". I think moral standards, at large, have certainly improved. The very concept of human rights, as understood today, was alien not so long ago. Same applies to concepts like presumption of innocence, equality before the law, equality of genders and ethinicities, freedom of the press, international laws regarding war/plunder/noncombatants, etc. Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here.
- Bartweiss 9y ago
  > Peter Singer's concept of The Expanding Circle is relevant here. That's a work I can support, definitely. I don't mean to sound too cynical; it's easy to get caught up in presentism and forget that basic ideas like "what if racism is bad?" and "should we maybe stop doing torture?" are relatively recent. My concern with Pinker is less that nothing has gotten better, and more that he seems overly rosy about the decline of violence (I worry we've largely displaced it and rendered it intermittent) and that he appears to frame moral progress as some kind of fundamental improvement in the moral nature of humans or society. I'm much more inclined to Singer's argument, that we're the same semi-moral creatures we've always been, but have done steadily better at acknowledging the moral weight of groups other than our own.