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I just read through the comments and was VERY surprised to see noone call this out: > At this point, the crook(s) installing the malware will contact co-conspi
by exikyut 9y ago
I just read through the comments and was VERY surprised to see noone call this out:
> At this point, the crook(s) installing the malware will contact co-conspirators who can remotely control the ATMs and force the machines to dispense cash.
Realize what this means. The ATMs are connected directly to the internet, with a VPN (hopefully...) sitting over the top of that. The ATM can still call out to the internet directly!!
That is, honestly, shocklingly insecure. I'm stunned.
I read https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16250498 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16250498 and how ATMs have different options for security, but "allow anything except the VPN software access to the NIC default route" doesn't sound like something _anything_ should be able to disable.
I mean... I know nothing about networking, and I was able to configure this exact behavior on FreeBSD - which I'd never used before - in a day. I set it up so a torrent program was physically incapable of doing DNS/anything outside of the VPN tunnel interface.
- Anthony-G 9y agoWhen I read that part, I figured that the crooks were using their own mobile Internet connection on the laptop or mobile device that they had connected to the ATM.
- exikyut 9y ago....Ah. That is a very real possibility. Thanks for pointing that out.
- icebraining 9y agoThat configuration only works if the attacker can't re-configure the system, but considering they're suggesting that many ATMs are still running Windows XP, I'm guessing that finding a privilege escalation exploit is not that hard.