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This article makes good points. For me the most salient is that the current reward structure ("how many strange new positive results have you published?") skews
by majos 9y ago
This article makes good points. For me the most salient is that the current reward structure ("how many strange new positive results have you published?") skews published research across almost all scientific fields, and that science in general needs to find a better way to incentivize the unglamorous work of reproducing splashy results and useful failures.
The suggested method of pre-registering hypotheses is certainly one way to address these issues. There are also more complicated methods of attacking self-fulfilling analyses through clever statistical tools [1], although I think this technology is not quite ready for wide use.
But I do wish that these articles did a better job of explaining how field specific the "replication crisis" is. It's a huge problem in psychology (such that I know ignore pretty much any experimental psych findings) and a bit less so in medicine. It's far less of a problem in, say, physics or computer science (recent deep learning experimental explosion notwithstanding) and maybe not at all the closer those areas get to math. Painting all scientists with this brush is not entirely fair.
[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.2664 https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.2664
- dflkajik 9y agoFirst, the problem is maybe best explained as being a problem with biomedical sciences (where psychology generally lands in topic analyses). If anything, the problem is worse in some areas of medicine than psychology. Estimates of replication rate in psychology vary from 25-78%, and are often around 50%. In other areas of medicine such as cancer research and pharmacology, the estimates often have varied from 11-25%. Some estimates of areas of neuroscience are lower than psychology also. Although I agree the problems probably vary across disciplines, it's also important to keep in mind this is in part because of where the flashlight is. Psychologists are studying this, and to a lesser extent, medical researchers, so they're kind of scrutinizing what they're familiar with. You allude to comp sci and AI, but as someone coming to that from statistics, there's a huge lack of awareness of generalizability of conclusions (tweak on large dataset, assume the size of the data protects against all), that manifests not so much as people raising the concern and it being dismissed as "if everyone is oblivious to it there's no problem." I think it's dangerous to assume that any area of science is immune. I also don't think it's really about "math" as much as it is about the complexity of the domain. There's incredibly complex sophisticated math in many areas of psychology (many AI models are variants of things routinely done in psychology), but it doesn't get attention because it's inconsistent with the assumptions (stereotypes?) of those outside the areas, and those within the field often take for granted. Similar arguments can be made about various areas of biomedicine. Science can either cede complex topics to those prefer demon haunting, or recognize that complex topics will be more challenging than simpler topics. I agree that more focus on sequential, adaptive model evaluation paradigms is needed; they are fascinating in their own right and have broad applicability. Overall, I see this as reflecting fundamental problems with incentive structures in academics and research in the moment. I really feel like academics and research is very broken, and that it's not a statistical problem as much as it is a problem with culture and economics. I say this as someone in the field who wants to see it fixed, not as someone who wants to bring it down. I agree with you completely that there's too much focus on glamour, fame, and selfish attention than anything else.