>... but our knowledge of the phenomenon is exactly equivalent to our knowledge of the math. I agree with that. > Ideally we would be writing our vague physic

>... but our knowledge of the phenomenon is exactly equivalent to our knowledge of the math. I agree with that. > Ideally we would be writing our vague physics explanations in an oligosynthetic language where we could append phenomes until a word had reached exactly the level of specificity implied. I imagine each of those phonemes is an additional 'qualification', adding more constraints to what is being said? I also feel like it should be mentioned that mathematical statements about physical phenomena carry a kind of ambiguity and aren't exact either. For instance, classical mechanics fails to take into account the curvature of spacetime in its predictions; so it may be accurate enough, but 'exact' isn't correct (even though everyone considered it to be for a long time). So then, is General Relativity 'exact'? It's an improvement, but calling it exact is unjustified. Then we have multiple candidate theories hoping to unify the domains of quantum and relativistic phenomena, but 1. it hasn't been done and 2. we still won't know if it's exact or just a better approximation. It may seem pedantic, but I think the distinction between 'exact' and 'ridiculously close' is important. 'Exact' tempts people into making an identification between the two things.